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I HAVE FEDERAL PLEADING ALL
FIGURED OUT
Bradley Scott Shannon†
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, both of which deal with federal civil
pleading standards, are important, but misunderstood. This Article
hopes to alleviate some of the confusion and place these decisions in
proper perspective. Viewed in terms of the two primary ways in which
an action may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted—factual insufficiency and legal insufficiency—
coupled with an understanding of a plaintiff’s obligations under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, these decisions arguably have
resulted in little practical change in the overall federal pleading
scheme. What these decisions have done, though, is brought renewed
attention to the requirement that a plaintiff’s allegations be supported
by evidence, and the problems that accompany such a requirement.
But this Article argues that concerns regarding a plaintiff’s
insufficiency of proof should be resolved not through Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8 and the requirement that a plaintiff “show” that it
is entitled to relief—as the Supreme Court appears to have done—but
rather through Rule 11. This Article also argues that a federal-court
action dismissed for failure to state a claim because of insufficiency
of proof should not be given claim-preclusive effect in those state
courts with less stringent pleading standards.

† Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. I thank Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., who,
though not necessarily agreeing with the substance of this Article, was kind enough to provide
extensive comments. I also thank the Case Western Reserve Law Review staff for their fine
editing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly1 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal2 are probably the most significant
civil procedure rulings in decades.3 Remarkably, though, for all of
their significance, there remains widespread confusion as to what
these decisions mean.4 The reaction to these decisions is also
remarkable, for despite broad disagreement as to the meaning of
Twombly and Iqbal, the consensus (at least within the legal academy)
has been negative.5 In particular, many have accused the Court of
reinterpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Rules”) and
thereby effecting a significant change in federal civil pleading
practice,6 a change that generally works to the disadvantage of
plaintiffs.7
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
3 See, e.g., Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1295
(2010) (“Twombly has been so influential that it is already among the most frequently cited
Supreme Court decisions of all time.”).
4 See, e.g., Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves in the
Lower Courts After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 852 (2008)
(“Because Twombly is so widely cited, it is particularly unfortunate that no one quite
understands what the case holds.”).
5 See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
473, 476 (2010) (“Scholars have been largely critical of [Twombly].”).
6 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing
Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 823 (2010) (“The Court has revolutionized the law on
pleading . . . [and] destabilized the entire system of civil litigation.”).
7 See, e.g., Comment, The Supreme Court 2008 Term: Leading Cases—Federal
Jurisdiction and Procedure, 123 HARV. L. REV. 252, 253 (2009) (“[The Twombly/Iqbal]
standard will likely constitute a substantial hurdle to most types of litigation.”).
Incidentally, though the concerns associated with Twombly and Iqbal impact not just
plaintiffs, but claiming parties generally, I use the shorthand term “plaintiff” throughout this
1
2
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The primary purpose of this Article is twofold. First, the Article
attempts to ease the confusion in this area by explaining the meaning
of Twombly and Iqbal and identifying their place in the broader
procedural context. Second, this Article attempts to show that some of
the criticism directed toward these decisions might be unfounded. In
its attempt to achieve this purpose, this Article will reach a number of
conclusions, many of which run counter to the conventional thinking
on this subject:
1. The Supreme Court’s rulings in Twombly and Iqbal probably
did not result in a significant change in the overall federal-court
pleading scheme. Rather, these decisions have brought increased
attention to a plaintiff’s obligations in the pleadings stage and have
invigorated the use of the motion to dismiss for “failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted,”8 much as the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,9 Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc.,10 and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio Corp.11 invigorated summary-judgment practice.12
2. The word “plausible” as used by the Supreme Court in
connection with a plaintiff’s allegations cannot be construed as
meaning “believable.” Rather, it must refer only to the factual
sufficiency of a complaint. This means that a factually suspicious (or
even frivolous), but otherwise factually and legally sufficient,
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
3. The venerable passage from Conley v. Gibson13 that was
“retired” by the Court in Twombly14—“that a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief”15—appears to be dicta, and in any
event related not to the factual sufficiency of a plaintiff’s allegations,
but rather to the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claim.
Article, both for clarity and because plaintiffs are probably the most impacted by these
decisions. For similar reasons, this Article uses “defendant,” rather than “defending party,” to
refer to those parties responding to a claiming party’s claims.
8 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
9 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
10 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
11 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
12 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (providing the federal standard for summary
judgment).
13 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
14 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562–63 (2007) (observing that the oftquoted “no set of facts” language in Conley consistently fails to “be understood in light of the
opinion’s preceding summary of the complaint’s concrete allegations, which the [Conley] Court
quite reasonably understood as amply stating a claim for relief” ).
15 Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46.
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4. Though there are currently several proposals to abrogate the
Supreme Court’s holdings in Twombly and Iqbal, all are probably
futile unless they also alter a plaintiff’s obligations under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11. In other words, the problem for plaintiffs
brought to the fore by Twombly and Iqbal does not relate to the
Court’s plausibility standard per se. Rather, the problem—if there is a
problem—lies in the requirement that a plaintiff’s factual allegations
(or “contentions”) “have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery,”16 coupled with the
limited ability to engage in formal discovery before the
commencement of the action.
5. Despite widespread dissatisfaction with the current federal
pleading scheme and the fact that it might differ from the practice in
some states, the federal scheme, if properly understood and applied,
does not unreasonably interfere with a plaintiff’s right to a jury trial
under the Seventh Amendment,17 and raises no choice-of-law issue
under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.18 Still, an argument can be
made that dismissals for failure to state a claim due to a failure to
comply with more stringent federal pleading requirements should not
be given claim preclusive effect in state courts with less stringent
requirements.
This Article contains a brief and general discussion of the more
significant rules governing federal pleading. It then attempts to
explain the applicable standard in terms of the three ways in which a
complaint properly may be dismissed for failure to state a claim:
factual insufficiency, legal insufficiency, and insufficiency of proof.
The Article then addresses two particularly troublesome and recurring
problems: the proper disposition of the frivolous complaint, and the
possible disparity between federal and state pleading requirements.
But contrary to its title, the goal of this Article is not to show that its
author indeed has federal pleading all figured out.19 Rather, the goal is
to reach a broader understanding of federal pleading practice, an
understanding that hopefully will lead to a more informed normative
debate as to where the line for pleading sufficiency should be drawn
and how that line might be moved, if desirable.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3).
U.S. Const. amend. VII.
18 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
19 Actually, the title of this Article, which was written mostly because everyone else
teaching civil procedure was writing on this subject, is this author’s idea of humor. And not to
be presumptuous, but the author actually looks forward to the almost inevitable response, “No
you don’t!”
16
17
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II. PLEADING FUNDAMENTALS AND GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL
Federal pleading, like federal procedure generally, is governed
primarily by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But the rules
related to pleading are sparse and, to a large extent, vague.
With respect to stating a claim, the primary rule is Rule 8(a),
which provides: “A pleading that states a claim for relief must
contain: . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief . . . .”20 Rule 8 also provides: “[e]ach
allegation must be simple, concise, and direct”;21 “[n]o technical form
is required”;22 and “[p]leadings must be construed so as to do
justice.”23 But though the Rules further provide that the defense of
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, if timely
raised by a defendant,24 results in the dismissal of that claim,25 the
Rules give no further guidance as to precisely how or why a claim
may be considered insufficient.
A review of relevant case law, though, reveals essentially three
ways in which an action properly may be dismissed for failure to state
a claim—i.e., three different types of problems or defects that can
render a complaint insufficient as a matter of law. This Article will
20 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a) also requires “a short and plain statement of the
grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” and “a demand for the relief sought.” FED. R. CIV. P.
8(a)(1), (3). But the jurisdictional statement usually relates more to, well, jurisdiction than it
does to stating a claim per se. For the latest word from the Supreme Court as to the meaning of
“jurisdiction” in this context and how it differs from claim-processing rules, see Reed Elsevier,
Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010). Similarly, the statement of the relief requested relates
primarily to other matters, and, in any event, any deficiencies in this regard are rarely
significant. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c) (“A default judgment must not differ in kind from, or
exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings. Every other final judgment should grant
the relief to which each party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded that relief in its
pleadings.”).
21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1).
22 Id.
23 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules . . . should be construed
and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.”)
24 Though the defense of failure to state a claim is typically raised in a preanswer motion
to dismiss, see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), it may be raised in the answer, by a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, a motion for summary judgment, or even at trial, see FED. R. CIV. P.
12(h)(2). But if the defense is not raised before the conclusion of the trial, it is waived. See
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510–11 (2006) (“[Defendant’s] failure to speak to the
issue prior to the conclusion of the trial on the merits would preclude vacation of
the . . . judgment . . . .” (citation omitted)).
25 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (providing a means to dispose of a claim even though
“dismissal” is not found in the text of the rule). Actually, it would be more accurate to say that
the successful assertion of this defense results in the disposition of that claim, for it results in a
dismissal only if asserted through a motion to dismiss. See Bradley Scott Shannon, Action Is an
Action Is an Action Is an Action, 77 WASH. L. REV. 65, 116–46 (2002) (explaining that “dismissal”
has a much narrower definition under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure than its common usage).
Overwhelmingly, though, the motion to dismiss is the means by which this defense is asserted.
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refer to these three problems as factual insufficiency,
insufficiency, and insufficiency of proof.26 By investigating
makes a complaint insufficient, perhaps one can reach
understanding as to what makes a complaint sufficient and,
importantly, where to draw the line.27

legal
what
some
more

A. Factual Insufficiency
In order to understand what must be included in a complaint, one
should reexamine the text of Rule 8(a).28 Rule 8(a) provides that a
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”29 What, exactly, does
this mean? In legal parlance, to “show” generally means to prove.30
But what does the rest of this rule require?
At least one thing is clear: whatever Rule 8(a) might require by
way of a “showing,” it need not—indeed, it must not—be long and
complicated. For the rule expressly provides that a plaintiff’s
statement of the claim, whatever else it is, must be “short and plain.”
Thus, whether one considers the Official Forms governing
complaints31 or the Supreme Court’s repeated rebuffs to calls for
26 One could use different terminology here, and could even divide up this area in a
completely different manner. For example, Allan Ides has argued that in order to state a valid
claim under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must have what he calls “transactional sufficiency,”
“procedural sufficiency,” and “substantive sufficiency.” Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the
Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a
Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice, 243 FED. RULES DECISIONS 604, 606–14
(2007). Moreover, this Article makes no claim that every pleading problem falls neatly into one
(and only one) of these three categories. Nonetheless, these categories at least provide a starting
point for discussion.
27 Some have argued—perhaps correctly—that the standard for sufficiency under Rule 8
is not the same as the standard for insufficiency under Rule 12(b)(6), and that a complaint might
be found sufficient for purposes of the former but not the latter. See, e.g., Kirksey v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Where the plaintiff has gone
astray is in supposing that a complaint which complies with Rule 8(a)(2) is immune from a
motion to dismiss. This confuses form with substance. Rule 8(a)(2) specifies the conditions of
the formal adequacy of the pleading. It does not specify the conditions of its substantive
adequacy, that is, its legal merit.”). But following Twombly and Iqbal, the current practice seems
to be to challenge even the marginal complaint and, for the sake of clarity, this Article will
assume that the standards are the same for both. Accordingly, the focus of this Article will be on
those allegations that must be included in a complaint to enable it to withstand a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim.
28 Cf. United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (“The task of
resolving the dispute over the meaning of [this statute] begins where all such inquiries must
begin: with the language of the statute itself.”).
29 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
30 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1413 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “show” as meaning: “To
make (facts, etc.) apparent or clear by evidence; to prove.”).
31 See FED. R. CIV. P. Forms 10–21. Though the Official Forms following the Rules
“suffice under these rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate,”
FED. R. CIV. P. 84, they have historically been mostly ignored by practitioners. But renewed
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heightened pleading outside of the context of Rule 9,32 the message is
always the same: very little is required in order for a complaint to
survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 33 Indeed, in
Twombly, the Court went out of its way to make it clear that this was
still true.34
But how little? Is it possible for a complaint to be too short and
plain? Yes. And the reason (again) is that Rule 8(a) also requires a
showing that the plaintiff is “entitled to relief.” What does this mean?
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the complaint must
“give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.”35 Thus, showing that one is entitled to
relief is about notice, though not simply notice that an action has been
commenced against the defendant, for that the summons
accomplishes.36 Rather, Rule 8(a) (again) requires that the plaintiff
give notice as to the nature of the claim and the grounds upon which
the claim rests. And why? Viewing the pleading rules as a whole, one
reason—perhaps the primary reason—appears to be to enable the
defendant to properly respond to the complaint—i.e., to give the
defendant a reasonable opportunity not only to admit or deny the

interest in Form 11 has been generated as a result of its discussion in Twombly (at which time it
was designated as Form 9). See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 n.10 (2007)
(contrasting the adequacy of Form 9 with the inadequacy of the plaintiffs’ complaint in that
case).
32 See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (“Rule 8(a)’s
simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited exceptions. Rule 9(b), for
example, provides for greater particularity in all averments of fraud or mistake. This Court,
however, has declined to extend such exceptions to other contexts.” (footnote omitted));
Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168
(1993) (“We think that it is impossible to square the ‘heightened pleading standard’ . . . with the
liberal system of ‘notice pleading’ set up by the Federal Rules.”).
33 Remarkably, though, despite the clarity of this language, many (if not most) federalcourt complaints are not entirely plain, and the vast majority are no where near short.
34 See 550 U.S. at 569 n.14 (“In reaching [the conclusion that the plaintiffs’ complaint was
insufficient], we do not apply any ‘heightened’ pleading standard, nor do we seek to broaden the
scope of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9, which can only be accomplished ‘by the process of
amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.’” (quoting Swierkiewicz, 534
U.S. at 515)); id. at 570 (“[W]e do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only
enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”).
35 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). One might observe that although the Court
might be correct from an interpretive perspective—after all, the Court is also the author of the
Rules, at least in theory—Rule 8(a)(2) mentions neither “notice” nor “grounds.” Some have
been confused on this point. See, e.g., McMahon, supra note 4, at 856 (“Seizing on the word
‘grounds’ in Rule 8, the Court held that ‘a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the “grounds” of his
“entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555)).
36 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(a)(1)(E) (requiring that the summons “notify the defendant that a
failure to appear and defend will result in a default judgment against the defendant for the relief
demanded in the complaint”).
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plaintiff’s allegations,37 but also to allege any merits-based
affirmative defenses (including failure to state a claim),38 compulsory
counterclaims,39 and third-party claims.40 Another, related reason is to
give the defendant a reasonable opportunity to assert any preanswer
motions to dismiss.41 In particular, the plaintiff’s complaint should
provide enough information to enable the defendant to identify those
actions that may be eliminated at the pleading stage.42 Thus, though
the line might be difficult to draw, virtually everyone agrees that “fair
notice” requires at least some level of detail as to the nature of the
plaintiff’s claims.
As a result, there is no doubt that a statement of a claim that
consists only of an allegation that the defendant is liable to the
plaintiff and provides no information beyond the request for relief,
would be considered insufficient.43 But what if a plaintiff alleged a bit
37 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1) (“In responding to a pleading, a party must . . . admit or
deny the allegations asserted against it by an opposing party.”). Of course, it is not as though a
defendant would be unable to respond even to the most general complaint, at least in a sense.
For example, if a plaintiff were to allege only that “you are liable to me in an amount to be
determined at trial,” a defendant probably would be entitled to respond with a general denial.
But such a response might well be false, at least in part, and would do nothing to remove factual
contentions from consideration at trial.
38 See id. (“In responding to a pleading, a party must . . . state in short and plain terms its
defenses to each claim asserted against it . . . .”).
39 See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a)(1) (“A pleading must state as a counterclaim any claim that—
at the time of its service—the [defendant] has against [the plaintiff] if the claim: (A) arises out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the [plaintiff]’s claim . . . .”).
40 See FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a)(1) (“A defending party may, as third-party plaintiff, serve a
summons and complaint on a nonparty who is or may be liable to [the defendant] for all or part
of the [plaintiff’s] claim against [the defendant]”). Of course, some might argue that any
problems caused by a lack of detail in a complaint eventually could be resolved by amending
the answer. But though this might be true to some extent, it seems that the primary purpose of
permitting a defendant to amend its answer cannot be to deal with matters that could have been
pleaded by the plaintiff at commencement, but were not. Moreover, there are other possible
reasons for providing notice of the grounds upon which one’s claim rests, including the need to
ascertain the preclusive reach of any adjudication on the merits and to enable the defendant to
determine whether it is entitled to a trial by jury. See Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 27
IOWA L. REV. 272, 273 (1942) (“[Pleadings] must sufficiently differentiate the situation of fact
which is being litigated from all other situations to allow application of the doctrine of res
judicata, whereby final adjudication of this particular case will end the controversy forever. As
a natural corollary, they will also show the type of case, so that it may be assigned to the proper
form of trial . . . .”).
41 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) (describing seven defenses that may be asserted through a
preanswer motion to dismiss, including failure to state a claim).
42 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (“[W]hen the allegations in a
complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, ‘this basic deficiency
should . . . be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties
and the court.’” (omission in original) (quoting 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1216, at 234 (3d. ed. 2004))).
43 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (“[T]he pleading standard Rule
8 . . . demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”).
There might be some disagreement, though, as to the proper means of dealing with such a
complaint. See infra notes 65–71 and accompanying text.

2/15/2011 7:09:03 PM

2011]

I HAVE FEDERAL PLEADING ALL FIGURED OUT

461

more? For example, what if a plaintiff also alleged that the defendant
was negligent, or (to recall Twombly), that the defendant violated
federal antitrust law? Such an allegation would provide more
information, but most would still consider it insufficient.44 And the
reason, again, is that this allegation does not sufficiently show that
this particular plaintiff is entitled to the relief requested of this
particular defendant. And if the mere naming of a recognized cause
of action is insufficient, then surely the mere recitation of the
elements of such a cause of action also would be insufficient.45
So what more is needed? It appears that facts are the answer46
though the Rules—quite intentionally—fail to mention the word
“facts,” and there is ultimately no meaningful distinction between
facts and law.47 But what sort of facts? It would not seem
unreasonable to require a plaintiff to plead enough facts to prove each
element of at least one recognized cause of action.48 After all, the
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is part of the same
procedural continuum as motions for summary judgment and for
44 It might be observed that such a “claim” would not be rendered insufficient because
such causes of action do not exist, for they do. This is not to say, though, that the nonexistence
of any particular cause of action cannot create a ground for the dismissal of an action; it can. But
that is a different problem than the problem being discussed here, and is the subject of a later
discussion. See infra Part II.B.
45 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555)); id. (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).
46 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it
is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of
the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”); see also Clark, supra
note 40, at 278 (“The notice in mind is . . . that of the general nature of the case and the
circumstances or events upon which it is based, so as to differentiate it from other acts or events,
to inform the opponent of the affair or transaction to be litigated . . . and to tell the court of the
broad outlines of the case . . . .”). As will be seen, though, nonconclusory (as opposed to factual)
allegations might be more accurate; understanding that the distinction between nonconclusory
and conclusory is no clearer than the distinction between fact and law.
47 See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction,
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769 (2003) (explaining why law and fact are not two distinct categories).
48 Though this does not appear to be the standard that the Court has adopted—indeed, as
will be explained, it appears that the Court has adopted a less-stringent standard—it does appear
that a firm understanding of the elements of a recognized cause of action is the starting point.
See, e.g., Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947 (“[W]e begin by taking note of the elements a plaintiff must
plead to state a claim of unconstitutional discrimination . . . .”). And whether one likes this
standard or not, this approach would be sufficient. See Steinman, supra note 3, at 1298 (“As
long as a complaint contains nonconclusory allegations for every element of a claim for relief, it
passes muster regardless of whether the judge might label the allegations implausible.”); see
also 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 8.04[1][c], at 8-37 (3d ed.
1997) (“Because a complaint may be attacked on plausibility grounds if there is no factual
support for a crucial element of a claim, what the rule is, in the abstract, as to whether a pleader
must state facts as to every element that is a part of the claim is irrelevant. Failure to do so may
render a complaint subject to attack for failing to plead a ‘plausible’ claim.”).
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judgment as a matter of law, meaning (in theory) that the standard for
each should be essentially the same, with the primary difference being
the nature of the “facts” being considered. Thus, whether the “facts”
at issue appear in the form of allegations (as they would under Rule
12(b)(6)), “paper” evidence—e.g., affidavits and certain discovery
responses—(as they would under Rule 56), or evidence admitted at
trial (as they would under Rule 50), the question at each juncture
seemingly should be whether a reasonable juror could find in favor of
the plaintiff.49 Such a standard also would not seem to be particularly
onerous, in that the district court is required to assume that all of the
plaintiff’s factual (or nonconclusory) allegations are true.50
In any event, and regardless of what the Supreme Court might
have meant in Twombly and Iqbal, this is not quite what it said.
Instead, the Court said that a plaintiff’s claim must be “plausible.”51
Whatever this term means52—and that has been the subject of
considerable debate53—it cannot mean that a plaintiff’s allegations
must be believable, for (again) a plaintiff’s allegations must be
believed.54 That is not what factual sufficiency is about (or supposed
to be about). Rather: “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
49 See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–52 (1986) (describing the
relevant standard at summary judgment in these terms and essentially equating it to the
judgment as a matter of law standard at trial).
50 See, e.g., Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (observing that, except for legal conclusions, “a court
must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint”).
51 See id. (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)).
52 Cf. McMahon, supra note 4, at 864 (“Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not include
a definition of ‘plausible’ in the Twombly decision.”).
53 For example, Professor Ides argues that a complaint must have transactional
sufficiency, meaning it “[m]ust be premised on a factual transaction and not simply on an
abstract invocation of the law”; procedural sufficiency, meaning it “[m]ust describe the factual
transaction with sufficient clarity to give the opposing party ‘fair notice’ of the underlying event
and of the nature of the claim arising out of that event”; and substantive sufficiency, meaning it
“[m]ust allege facts sufficient to show that the pleader is entitled to relief, which is to say that
the pleading must state a claim on which relief can be granted.” Ides, supra note 26, at 607.
There are several other and sometimes conflicting approaches, but the resolution of these
various approaches is beyond the scope of this Article.
54 This point, though well established, can hardly be emphasized enough, and will be
discussed again in Part III.A. It is true that the Court has held that conclusory allegations are not
entitled to this presumption, see, e.g., Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949, and one can fairly debate
whether any particular allegation is conclusory or not (and perhaps the Court’s own analysis has
not been entirely clear in this regard). But even the Iqbal Court made it quite plain: “[i]t is the
conclusory nature of [a plaintiff’s] allegations, rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature,
that disentitles them to the presumption of truth.” Id. at 1951; accord Hartnett, supra note 5, at
483 (“[N]o Justice interprets Twombly to empower a judge to disregard factual allegations
simply because the judge finds them implausible.”).
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alleged.”55 Thus, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a
court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”56
So why did the Supreme Court find the Twombly and Iqbal
complaints deficient? It was not because they were too short; to the
contrary, in both cases, the complaints were quite long, and much
longer (for example) than that set forth in Official Form 11. It was
also not because the plaintiffs included conclusory allegations in their
complaints, for that seems almost unavoidable (and such appear to be
included in Form 11 as well). Instead, the problem was that they did
not contain sufficient nonconclusory (and nonneutral) allegations
indicative of liability.57 Essentially, the plaintiffs in both cases failed
to allege sufficient specific facts in support of an element of their
respective causes of action (or, more precisely, sufficient
nonconclusory allegations to “permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct”58). And because their claims were
factually insufficient, they were subject to dismissal for failure to state
a claim.
Is the Twombly/Iqbal “plausibility” standard the proper standard
by which to assess the sufficiency of a complaint for the purpose of a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim? Though most have
argued “no,” the answer does not seem quite so clear. On the one
hand, the standard imposed in these cases does seem to be higher than
that imposed previously, at least in the minds of most lawyers. On the
other hand, the current standard does not necessarily seem to
represent an incorrect (or even inferior) interpretation of rule text,
55 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Again, this standard seems
to require less than what is demanded of a plaintiff at summary judgment or at trial. See id.
(“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556));
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (“And, of course, a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it
strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts alleged is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is
very remote and unlikely.’” (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974))).
56 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950; accord id. at 1959 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Under Twombly,
the relevant question is whether, assuming the factual allegations are true, the plaintiff has stated
a ground for relief that is plausible.”). Of course, as with the distinction between conclusory and
nonconclusory, see supra text accompanying note 46, the distinction between possible and
plausible is not entirely clear. And as Iqbal itself seems to demonstrate, reasonable jurists might
disagree as to the sufficiency of any particular complaint (even assuming agreement as to the
appropriate standard).
57 See, e.g., Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (“While legal conclusions can provide the
framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”). One must
acknowledge the possibility, though, that the Court in those cases might have failed to properly
apply its own analysis, an analysis that was largely unaided by prior lower-court determinations
(understanding that it also might be impossible to separate completely abstract statements of the
law from legal analysis).
58 Id.
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particularly when considering the federal pleading scheme as a
whole.59 But regardless of how this debate regarding the normative
propriety of the Court’s “plausibility” standard is resolved—and that
is decidedly not the purpose of this Article60—one might keep in
mind that if factual insufficiency truly is the problem with a plaintiff’s
complaint, then there is not much of a problem, at least not in most
cases. This is because factual insufficiency is usually easily cured,
given the extremely liberal standard for amending complaints.61 Only
if, after being given a reasonable opportunity to amend, a plaintiff is
unwilling or unable to cure the deficiency may an action be dismissed
on this ground.62 This means—and this is important—that dismissals
on this basis should be exceedingly rare. Thus, though considerable
time and energy has been devoted to ascertaining precisely what is or
is not plausible, in the vast majority of cases, the plaintiff should be
able to satisfy almost any pleading standard that a district court might
reasonably impose.63 In cases like Twombly (and perhaps Iqbal), then,
59 That said, to the extent the standard articulated in Twombly and Iqbal differs from what
the Court held previously, the Court probably should have explained why, after seventy years,
its current understanding as to the meaning of Rule 8 is superior. Along this line, the Court’s
attempt in Twombly to justify its interpretation—seemingly after the fact—based on the high
cost of discovery and the potential to extort a settlement, see 550 U.S. at 557–60, arguably falls
short. Though these concerns might have some validity as a policy matter, the Court provides no
evidence that they were behind the language used by the original drafters of the Rules.
60 Some additional thoughts on this subject nonetheless will be offered later in this
Article. See infra Part III.A.
61 As recently amended, Rule 15(a)(1) provides:
A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within:
(A) 21 days after serving it, or
(B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after
service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule
12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1). This means, in essence, that a plaintiff is now given one free shot at
amending its complaint should the defendant move to dismiss for failure to state a claim or
include such a defense in its answer. And even if the plaintiff fails to meet the twenty-one-day
deadline imposed by Rule 15(a)(1), it still may seek leave to amend from the district court,
which the court “should freely give . . . when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). See
also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (elucidating this standard).
62 Some fail to recall, for example, that this possibility was raised at the conclusion of the
Court’s opinion in Iqbal. See 129 S. Ct. at 1954 (“The Court of Appeals should decide in the
first instance whether to remand to the District Court so that respondent can seek leave to amend
his deficient complaint.”).
63 Cf. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (“[I]t should not prove
burdensome for a plaintiff who has suffered an economic loss to provide a defendant with some
indication of the loss and the causal connection that the plaintiff has in mind.”). Admittedly,
there are some portions of Twombly and Iqbal that still might be cause for concern. For
example, in Iqbal, the Court stated, “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim
for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.” 129 S. Ct. at 1950. This might be read as conferring
considerable discretion on the courts in this context. Moreover, the Iqbal Court instructed that
“a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that,
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. This

2/15/2011 7:09:03 PM

2011]

I HAVE FEDERAL PLEADING ALL FIGURED OUT

465

the more interesting (and more important) question is why the
plaintiffs in those cases were unable to meet the Court’s plausibility
standard.64
One last thought relates to the proper means of attacking a
factually insufficient complaint. A defendant, of course, need not do
anything with respect to an insufficient complaint, and need not do
anything at the pleading stage.65 But if a defendant does want to
challenge the factual sufficiency of a complaint, what is the proper
procedural course? Some have suggested that, rather than move to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant concerned with the
sufficiency of a complaint instead should move for a more definite
statement pursuant to Rule 12(e),66 and there is language in some
Supreme Court opinions that might be read as suggesting this
approach.67 But it should be acknowledged that not every pleading

presumes an ability to properly separate the conclusory from the nonconclusory, a somewhat
dubious proposition. Finally, it is true that an unnecessarily high pleading standard, as well as an
ambiguous pleading standard—both of which are more likely to result in a need to replead—
impose additional, unnecessary costs. But again, it is not the purpose of this Article to suggest
precisely what the federal pleading standard should be.
64 A few others have asked the same question. See, e.g., Saritha Komatireddy Tice, Recent
Developments: A “Plausible” Explanation of Pleading Standards: Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 827, 831 n.46 (2008) (“Because
leave to amend is given liberally, the plaintiffs’ failure to cure this defect here is even more
perplexing.”). Of course, the Twombly plaintiffs did amend their complaint before dismissal. See
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550 (citing the plaintiffs’ amended complaint). So the key question
(again) is why those plaintiffs were nonetheless unable to meet the Court’s standard. See infra
Part II.C.
65 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
66 See, e.g., Has The Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 95 (2009) (statement of Stephen B. Burbank,
David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania) (“The
architecture of Iqbal’s mischief . . . is clear. The foundation is the Court’s mistaken conflation
of the question of the legal sufficiency of a complaint, which is tested under Rule 12(b)(6), with
the question of its sufficiency to provide adequate notice to the defendant, which is tested under
Rule 12(e).”). Rule 12(e) provides:
A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a
responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party
cannot reasonably prepare a response. The motion must be made before filing a
responsive pleading and must point out the defects complained of and the details
desired. If the court orders a more definite statement and the order is not obeyed
within 14 days after notice of the order or within the time the court sets, the court
may strike the pleading or issue any other appropriate order.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e).
67 See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957) (“Such simplified ‘notice
pleading’ is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial
procedures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and
defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues.”); see also Twombly, 550
U.S. at 590 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The remedy for an allegation lacking sufficient
specificity to provide adequate notice is, of course, a Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite
statement.” (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002))).
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deficiency may be cured by a motion for a more definite statement. A
motion for a more definite statement is “limited . . . to instances in
which the challenged pleading ‘is so vague or ambiguous that a party
cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading.’”68 It is
possible for a complaint to be sufficient for the purpose of framing a
responsive pleading and yet fail to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. Each rule has its own office. Moreover, so long as a
plaintiff, in order to state a claim, must show that it is entitled to
relief, the failure to do so must constitute a failure to state a claim.
There does not appear to be any requirement that a defendant move
for a more definite statement, rather than a dismissal, with respect to a
complaint that fails to state a claim. To the contrary, “[i]f the movant
believes the opponent’s pleading does not state a claim for relief, the
proper course is a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) even if the pleading is
vague or ambiguous.”69 In other words, to argue that a motion for a
more definite statement is the sole remedy for the factually
insufficient complaint is to suggest that factual insufficiency can
never result in a failure to state a claim, and that seems incorrect.70
Finally, there is, to some extent, little practical difference between
these procedures, in that the burden imposed on the plaintiff
(amendment of the complaint), as well as the penalty for failure to
adequately respond to the deficiency in question (dismissal of the
action), are essentially the same.71
68 5C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 42, at 309 (quoting former Rule 12(e)); accord id.
§ 1375, at 306 (“[T]he only legitimate purpose of a Rule 12(e) motion is to aid the movant in
responding to an objectionable pleading.”); see also 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 488,
¶ 12.36[1], at 12-121 (“Rule 12(e)’s standard is plainly designed to strike at unintelligibility
rather than lack of detail.”); id. at 12-122 (“[P]roper pleading under Rule 8 requires a pleading
to contain allegations of each element of the claim. If it does not, and if the deficiency is not so
material that the pleading should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), a more definite statement is
appropriate.”).
69 5C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 42, § 1237, at 309; accord id. (“[E]ven if the
pleading is so sketchy that it cannot be construed to show a right to relief, the proper attack is by
a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) rather than Rule 12(e).”); see also id. at 311 (“Thus, the class of
pleadings that are appropriate subjects for a motion under Rule 12(e) is quite small.”).
Perhaps an analogy may be made to Rule 12(f) and the motion to strike. If a complaint
were to contain “any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter,” FED. R. CIV. P.
12(f), a motion to strike would be an appropriate procedure. But if such a complaint were also to
be insufficient as a matter of law, there does not appear to be any reason why a defendant could
not instead move to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
70 It is somewhat unclear whether that is the view of Professor Burbank, see supra note 66
and accompanying text, but again, such a view seems suspect, as the weight of authority is to
the contrary.
71 See 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 42, § 1356, at 371–72 (“[R]epeated refusals by
the plaintiff to conform to the dictates of Rule 8 and Rule 10 as to the proper form or content of
the pleading may result in a dismissal for failure to state a claim.”).
Some have alternatively argued that in lieu of a dismissal for failure to state a claim, a
plaintiff with a factually insufficient complaint might be ordered to reply to the defendant’s
answer pursuant to Rule 7(a)(7). But there are problems with this argument as well. For one
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B. Legal Insufficiency
The second way in which an action may be dismissed under Rule
12(b)(6) is for legal insufficiency. A good example of legal
insufficiency can be found in Judge Richard Posner’s opinion for the
court in Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.72 In Kirksey, the
plaintiff attempted to allege a personal-injury claim against two
cigarette manufacturers.73 The defendants moved to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, arguing that the plaintiff’s claim was either
preempted by federal law or unrecognized under Illinois state law.74
The plaintiff responded that Rule 8(a)(2) requires little in the way of
facts, and nothing in the way of legal theories.75 Though the court of
appeals essentially agreed, it held, in affirming the dismissal of the
plaintiff’s action, that apparent compliance with Rule 8 was
insufficient.
This confuses form with substance. Rule 8(a)(2) specifies the
conditions of the formal adequacy of a pleading. It does not
specify the conditions of its substantive adequacy, that is, its
legal merit. . . .
It is true that a claim should not be dismissed out of hand just
because it is so novel that it cannot be fitted into an existing
legal category . . . . But a claim that does not fit into an
existing legal category requires more argument by the
plaintiff to stave off dismissal, not less, if the defendant
moves to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff’s claim has
no basis in law. The plaintiff has to show that while her claim
has no basis in existing law, or at least the law’s current
pigeonholes, it lies in the natural line of the law’s

thing, “[a] clear showing of necessity or of extraordinary circumstances of a compelling nature
will usually be required before the court will order a reply.” 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 488,
¶ 7.02[7][b], at 7-12. A deficient complaint does not seem to be the sort of “necessity”
contemplated under this procedure, given that there is already a different procedure for dealing
with that problem. Perhaps more importantly, a reply presupposes an answer, and it is precisely
to avoid preparing an answer that a defendant asserts the defense of failure to state a claim in a
preanswer motion. Finally, as with the use of Rule 12(e), it does not appear that the use of a
reply in this context would accomplish anything that could not be accomplished by a motion to
dismiss.
72 168 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1999).
73 Id. at 1040.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 1040–41.
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development and should now be recognized as a part of the
law.76
Thus, in addition to factual sufficiency, a claim must be legally
sufficient. Legal sufficiency is important because a plaintiff that fails
to rely on any recognized legal theory cannot possibly win at trial or
at any other stage in the proceedings.77
It should now be apparent that the problem in both Twombly and
Iqbal was not legal insufficiency. For in both cases, the plaintiffs
attempted to plead recognized causes of action.78
By contrast, the famous “no set of facts” passage from the
Supreme Court’s decision in Conley v. Gibson79 did relate to legal
insufficiency.80 In Conley, the Court began:
Id. at 1041–42.
As noted previously, see supra text accompanying note 27, the Kirksey court seemed to
suggest that the standard for sufficiency under Rule 8 might be lower than that required under
Rule 12(b)(6). But it is not at all clear that this is true, for it is difficult to see how the pleading
of a legally insufficient claim shows that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. It is also difficult to see
how a vague or ambiguous complaint could be found sufficient under Rule 8, for if it could,
how could such a complaint be challenged under Rule 12(e)? It might well be, then, that the
standard for sufficiency under Rule 8 is actually higher, not lower, than that required under Rule
12(b)(6).
78 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1947–49 (2009) (describing “the elements a
plaintiff must plead to state a claim of unconstitutional discrimination against officials entitled
to assert the defense of qualified immunity”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 548
(2007) (describing “[l]iability under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1”).
Professor Ides explains Twombly in somewhat different terms. He argues that the problem
was one of substantive sufficiency, which “requires that the facts alleged comprise a claim on
which relief can be granted, i.e., the factual allegations must be sufficient to show ‘that the
pleader is entitled to relief.’” Ides, supra note 26, at 611 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
Professor Ides of course agrees that the plaintiffs in that case were at least trying to plead a
claim based on a recognized cause of action. The problem was that the nonconclusory facts
alleged in the plaintiffs’ complaint did not adequately plead such a claim. See id. at 627 (“An
‘agreement’ is a material element of a § 1 claim. Therefore, a sufficient outline or adumbration
of a § 1 claim must include allegations supportive of that material element.”). Though this
seems to be a correct appraisal, one might observe that “substantive” sufficiency, as he uses that
phrase, seems to include a factual as well as a legal component—i.e., a complaint, in order to
survive a motion to dismiss, must be based on a recognized cause of action and must include
sufficient nonconclusory allegations. It seems useful, however, to distinguish the situation in
Twombly from that in Kirksey, in which there was no such underlying cause of action. Thus
(again), this Article argues that the problem in the former was factual insufficiency, whereas the
problem in the latter was legal insufficiency.
Having said this—and not to resurrect any sort of hard fact/law distinction—it does not
seem particularly useful to recast what are essentially factual insufficiency problems in terms of
legal insufficiency. For example, Professor Ides argues, “[i]n essence, [the Twombly plaintiffs]
pled themselves out of court by filing a complaint that alleged a claim unrecognized by the
Sherman Act, namely, a claim of anticompetitive parallel conduct.” Id. at 631. Though this is
one way to view the world, it does not appear that this was the approach the plaintiffs in that
case were trying to take, as it seems that the plaintiffs in that action knew that parallel conduct
alone would not suffice at trial. Instead, it appears that they were hoping that discovery would
provide whatever additional detail might have been missing from their complaint.
79 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).
80 Arguably, though, it was not a part of any holding by that Court, as many seem to
76
77
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Once again Negro employees are here under the Railway
Labor Act asking that their collective bargaining agent be
compelled to represent them fairly. In a series of cases
beginning with Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., this
Court has emphatically and repeatedly ruled that an exclusive
bargaining agent under the Railway Labor Act is obligated to
represent all employees in the bargaining unit fairly and
without discrimination because of race and has held that the
courts have power to protect employees against such
invidious discrimination.81
When the Court finally addressed the failure-to-state-a-claim issue, it
stated:
under the general principles laid down in the Steele, Graham,
and Howard cases the complaint adequately set forth a claim

believe. See, e.g., Emily Sherwin, The Story of Conley: Precedent by Accident, in CIVIL
PROCEDURE STORIES 295, 295 (Kevin M. Clermont 2d ed., 2008) (describing this passage in
that manner). In Conley, the defendants moved to dismiss on three grounds: “(1) the National
Railroad Adjustment Board had exclusive jurisdiction over the controversy; (2) the Texas and
New Orleans Railroad, which had not been joined, was an indispensible party defendant; and
(3) the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be given.” Conley, 355 U.S. at
43. The district court granted the motion to dismiss on the jurisdictional ground, id. at 43-44,
and, presumably because it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action, “did not pass on
the other reasons advanced for dismissal,” id. at 45. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
“apparently relying on the same ground,” affirmed the judgment of the district court. Id. at 44.
The Supreme Court held that “it was error for the courts below to dismiss the complaint for lack
of jurisdiction.” Id. But rather than remand for lower court consideration of the other grounds
for dismissal, the Court found “it timely and proper . . . to consider them here.” Id. at 45.
Whether the Supreme Court should have proceeded to express its view as to the
indispensible-party and failure-to-state-a-claim issues is debatable. On the one hand, these other
issues were “briefed and argued by both parties and the respondents urge[d] that the decision
below be upheld, if necessary, on these other grounds.” Id. On the other hand, the Supreme
Court often considers it beneficial, and sometimes even demands, that issues first be considered
by lower courts. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120–21 (1976) (“It is the general
rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon
below.”). Additionally, although (as indicated) the Court generally may affirm the judgment of
the court of appeals on any basis, in Conley, the Court did not affirm; it reversed. Be that as it
may, there is little doubt that the Court’s discussion of the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’
complaint was dicta, for it had nothing to do with the Court’s judgment, which, strictly
speaking, related only to subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court’s discussion of the failure-tostate-a-claim issue seemingly could not count even as an alternative holding, as, by itself, it was
insufficient in that the Court could not have reversed on the basis of that issue alone. Though
some might read this portion of the Court’s opinion as indicative of what the Court might hold
in the future, and though later courts (perhaps even the Supreme Court) might have so held,
what the Conley Court said as to this issue has no binding precedential value. For this reason
alone, it is somewhat surprising that the Twombly Court (which never refers to this language as
a holding and assiduously seems to avoid the term “overrule”) went to the trouble to “retire” this
language. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562–63 (noting that Conley’s “no set of facts language” has
“puzzl[ed] the profession for 50 years” and “earned its retirement”).
81 Conley, 355 U.S. at 42 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
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upon which relief could be granted. In appraising the
sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the accepted
rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief. Here, the complaint alleged, in part, that
petitioners were discharged wrongfully by the Railroad and
that the Union, acting according to plan, refused to protect
their jobs as it did those of white employees or to help them
with their grievances all because they were Negroes. If these
allegations are proven there has been a manifest breach of the
Union’s statutory duty to represent fairly and without hostile
discrimination all of the employees in the bargaining unit.
This Court squarely held in Steele and subsequent cases that
discrimination in representation because of race is prohibited
by the Railway Labor Act. The bargaining representative’s
duty not to draw “irrelevant and invidious” distinctions
among those it represents does not come to an abrupt end, as
the respondents seem to contend, with the making of an
agreement between union and employer. Collective
bargaining is a continuing process. Among other things, it
involves day-to-day adjustments in the contract and other
working rules, resolution of new problems not covered by
existing agreements, and the protection of employee rights
already secured by contract. The bargaining representative
can no more unfairly discriminate in carrying out these
functions than it can in negotiating a collective agreement. A
contract may be fair and impartial on its face yet administered
in such a way, with the active or tacit consent of the union, as
to be flagrantly discriminatory against some members of the
bargaining unit.82
Only later in its opinion did the Conley Court discuss the problem at
issue in Twombly and Iqbal: factual insufficiency.
The respondents also argue that the complaint failed to set
forth specific facts to support its general allegations of
discrimination and that its dismissal is therefore proper. The
decisive answer to this is that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the
facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the
82 Id. at 45–46 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944)).
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Rules require is “a short and plain statement of the claim”
that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. The illustrative
forms appended to the Rules plainly demonstrate this. Such
simplified “notice pleading” is made possible by the liberal
opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures
established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis
of both claim and defense and to define more narrowly the
disputed facts and issues. Following the simple guide of Rule
8(f) that “all pleadings shall be so construed as to do
substantial justice,” we have no doubt that petitioners’
complaint adequately set forth a claim and gave the
respondents fair notice of its basis. The Federal Rules reject
the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one
misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and
accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to
facilitate a proper decision on the merits.83
When properly viewed as relating to legal insufficiency,84 it is
somewhat surprising that the Twombly Court decided to “retire” the
Conley Court’s “no set of facts” language, for it does not seem to say
anything controversial. It has long been—and presumably still is—the
law that an action must not be dismissed if the facts alleged in the
complaint would entitle the plaintiff to relief under some recognized
legal theory, irrespective of whether any particular legal theory has
been pleaded.85 The problem is that the Twombly Court—
83 Id. at 47–48 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). In contrast to the “no set of facts”
language, this portion of the Conley opinion was quoted by the Twombly Court with approval.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
84 A few others have also made this observation. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 66, at 12
(“[T]he Conley Court’s use of the ‘no set of facts’ language was intended to address only those
situations in which, no matter how compelling the facts alleged, the law did not provide
relief.”); Sherwin, supra note 80, at 315-16 (arguing that the way to make sense of the Conley
opinion is to note that the “no set of facts” language “refers only to determining whether any
legal claim could exist, not to testing how detailed its factual statement need be”).
85 See 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 48, ¶ 8.04[3], at 8-40 (“Rule 8(a)(2) does not require a
claimant to set forth any legal theory justifying the relief sought on the facts alleged, but does
require sufficient factual averments to show that the claimant may be entitled to some relief.”).
It seems, though, that at least some factual detail must be alleged in the complaint to enable a
district court to reasonably decide this issue. In other words, just as a challenge to legal
sufficiency “requires more argument by the plaintiff to stave off dismissal, not less,” Kirksey v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1042 (7th Cir. 1999), it also might require more in
the way of factual allegations. See 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 488, ¶ 12.34[1][b], at 12-79
(“[T]he pleading must at least set forth sufficient information for the court to determine whether
some recognized legal theory exists on which relief could be accorded the pleader. If it fails to
do so, a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) will be granted.”). In this sense, the fact/law distinction
again begins to blur somewhat, in that a plaintiff’s ability to plead a valid claim—i.e., one based
on a recognized cause of action or legal theory—depends to some extent on the plaintiff’s
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erroneously—read this passage as relating to factual insufficiency. As
that Court stated:
This “no set of facts” language can be read in isolation as
saying that any statement revealing the theory of the claim
will suffice unless its factual impossibility may be shown
from the face of the pleadings; and the Court of Appeals
appears to have read Conley in some such way when
formulating its understanding of the proper pleading standard.
On such a focused and literal reading of Conley’s “no set of
facts,” a wholly conclusory statement of claim would survive
a motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the
possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some “set of
[undisclosed] facts” to support recovery. So here, the Court of
Appeals specifically found the prospect of unearthing direct
evidence of conspiracy sufficient to preclude dismissal, even
though the complaint does not set forth a single fact in a
context that suggests an agreement. It seems fair to say that
this approach to pleading would dispense with any showing
of a “‘reasonably founded hope’” that a plaintiff would be
able to make a case; Mr. Micawber’s optimism would be
enough.
Seeing this, a good many judges and commentators have
balked at taking the literal terms of the Conley passage as a
pleading standard. . . .
We could go on, but there is no need to pile up further
citations to show that Conley’s “no set of facts” language has
been questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough.
To be fair to the Conley Court, the passage should be
understood in light of the opinion’s preceding summary of the
complaint’s concrete allegations, which the Court quite
reasonably understood as amply stating a claim for relief. But
the passage so often quoted fails to mention this
understanding on the part of the Court, and after puzzling the

ability to marshal sufficient, relevant facts. Thus, it might be true that the federal rules
governing legal sufficiency “are in general adequate because judgments on the validity of
claims do not require any discovery.” Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How
Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 61,
61 (2007) (emphasis added). But there are probably a few cases in which discovery would lead
to claims of which the plaintiff was previously unaware.

2/15/2011 7:09:03 PM

2011]

I HAVE FEDERAL PLEADING ALL FIGURED OUT

473

profession for 50 years, this famous observation has earned
its retirement. The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete,
negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim
has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing
any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the
complaint. Conley, then, described the breadth of opportunity
to prove what an adequate complaint claims, not the
minimum standard of adequate pleading to govern a
complaint’s survival.86
If this portion of Conley is read as applying to factual
insufficiency, then the Twombly Court’s rejection of that language is
surely correct. For it is also the law that a plaintiff cannot allege
anything short of impossibility and have it suffice as a factual
matter.87 A complaint can only be evaluated based on those
allegations that are pleaded, not on what a plaintiff might some day
prove, which cannot be known or predicted by the court or even the
defendant. But (again), that is not the context in which this passage
arises.88
86 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561–63 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citations
omitted); see also id. at 553 (“Although the Court of Appeals took the view that plaintiffs must
plead facts that ‘include conspiracy among the realm of “plausible” possibilities in order to
survive a motion to dismiss,’ it then said that ‘to rule that allegations of parallel anticompetitive
conduct fail to support a plausible conspiracy claim, a court would have to conclude that there is
no set of facts that would permit a plaintiff to demonstrate that the particular parallelism
asserted was the product of collusion rather than coincidence.’” (quoting Twombly v. Bell Atl.
Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 114 (2d Cir. 2005))).
87 This also supplies part of the reason why the factual insufficiency of a complaint can
serve as a basis for a dismissal for failure to state a claim. Many have described the futility of
demanding greater particularity in pleadings and they are correct in that plaintiffs frequently do
not have an entirely clear view of their cases at commencement and in that the admission of
material allegations by defendants is rare. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 40, at 274 (discussing the
difficulties lawyers have to confront when faced with a demand for greater specificity in
pleadings). But such arguments also seem to presume that every complaint contains a legally
sufficient claim and that presumption seems unwarranted. A plaintiff should not be able to hide
a legally insufficient claim behind a factually insufficient statement of that claim. Such claims
should be eliminated at the pleading stage, not at summary judgment.
88 Similarly, the Twombly Court is undoubtedly also correct regarding the “breadth of
opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint claims,” and the idea that “once a claim has
been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the
allegations in the complaint.” 550 U.S. at 563. But contrary to the Twombly Court’s explanation,
that is not at all what the Conley Court stated, let alone held.
Incidentally, as the Twombly Court correctly observed that, a similar misreading (or
overreading) of precedent appears to have occurred with respect to another venerable pleading
decision: Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002). The precise issue before the
Swierkiewicz Court was “whether a complaint in an employment discrimination lawsuit must
contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the framework set
forth by this Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508. The
Court held that “an employment discrimination complaint need not include such facts and
instead must contain only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
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If a complaint is found to be legally insufficient, is there anything
that a plaintiff can do to avoid dismissal? Probably not, for unlike the
factual insufficiency context, wherein the opportunity to amend
potentially will save many deficient complaints, there seems to be
little a plaintiff can do when the law fails to provide for the relief
requested.89 One might try waiting as long as the applicable statute of
limitation will allow for the law to change, or being judicious in one’s
choice of forum if that would result in a different source of
substantive law. But aside from that, a plaintiff seemingly has little

entitled to relief.’” Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). In support of its holding, the Court
observed, “it is not appropriate to require a plaintiff to plead facts establishing a prima facie case
because the McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply in every employment discrimination
case,” id. at 511, and because “the precise requirements of a prima facie case can vary
depending on the context,” id. at 512. Though the Court went on to state that the plaintiff’s
complaint “easily satisfies the requirements of Rule 8(a),” id. at 514, it is not at all clear that the
Court’s analysis as to the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint in the absence of any “prima
facie case” requirement (an issue that does not appear to have been decided by any lower court
in that case) may fairly be characterized as a holding. Id. Stated another way: if the issue before
the Court is whether a complaint must include Y, and the Court decides that a complaint need
not include Y, that would constitute a holding. If the Court were to go further and state that the
reason why Y need not be included is that a complaint need only include X, that also seemingly
would constitute a holding (particularly when X consists of little more than a recitation of the
relevant procedural rule). But whether a statement by the Court that the complaint at issue
actually included X properly could be regarded as a holding is far from clear. Indeed, given the
precise nature of the defendant’s motion in that case, one could fairly conclude that the
defendant had all but conceded sufficiency in all other respects. See SUP. CT. R. 14(1)(a) (“Only
the questions set out in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the
Court.”); cf. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 528 (1992) (“Petitioners suggest that the
statutory procedure for changing the use of a mobile home park is in practice ‘a kind of
gauntlet,’ in that they are not in fact free to change the use of their land. Because petitioners do
not claim to have run that gauntlet, however, this case provides no occasion to consider how the
procedure has been applied to petitioners’ property, and we accordingly confine ourselves to the
face of the statute.”) (citations omitted).
The same analysis appears to apply with respect to the Court’s reasoning in Leatherman v.
Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit. 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993) (“We
granted certiorari to decide whether a federal court may apply a ‘heightened pleading
standard’—more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure—in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under Rev. Stat.
§ 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We hold it may not.”).
By contrast, in Twombly (as well as in Iqbal), the issue related to the precise nature of the
appropriate pleading standard in the absence of any sort of heightened pleading requirement.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942–43 (2009) (“This case . . . turns on a narrower
question: Did respondent, as the plaintiff in the District Court, plead factual matter that, if taken
as true, states a claim that petitioners deprived him of his clearly established constitutional
rights.”); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553 (“We granted certiorari to address the proper standard for
pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct . . . .”).
Thus, contrary to the views of some of the Court’s critics, the Court’s explanation of the
pleading standard demanded under Rule 8 and its attempt to distinguish that demanded under
Rule 9 might not be entirely inconsistent with prior precedent.
89 This presumes that one can distinguish the situation where a plaintiff might have a valid
claim but has failed to sufficiently state it, from the situation where a plaintiff is unable to state
a recognized claim because none exists.
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choice but to somehow convince the district court that the cause of
action underlying its claim, though novel, should be recognized.90
C. Insufficiency of Proof
The final way in which an action may be dismissed for failure to
state a claim is insufficiency of proof.91 What does this mean in the
context of pleading and the sufficiency of a complaint?
There is a wonderful old case out of Utah found in Stephen
Yeazell’s civil procedure textbook,92 Reid v. San Pedro, Los Angeles
and Salt Lake Railroad Co.,93 that well illustrates the point. In Reid, a
rancher was pasturing cattle on land adjacent to a railroad.94 The
plaintiff alleged that a fence constructed by the railroad company to
keep livestock off the tracks was “broken and in poor repair and
become down so that cattle had an easy passage through [it].”95 At the
same time, a gate that had been installed for the convenience of the
landowner also had been left open.96 Tragically, “a three year old
heifer of the plaintiff strayed on the right of way of said defendant
company” and the railroad company’s train “ran on and over said
heifer,” resulting in her untimely death.97 Under the prevailing law, if
the heifer escaped through the fence, the railroad company was liable,
whereas an escape through the gate was the rancher’s responsibility.98
90 See Kirksey, 168 F.3d at 1042 (speculating that the plaintiff’s lawyer’s problem in that
case “is that he really cannot think of a viable legal basis for his client’s claim, that he hopes
that the current legal ferment in the world of tobacco litigation will brew him up a theory at
some future date if only he can stave off immediate dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)”).
Of course, there might be any number of other, extrajudicial things that a plaintiff might
do in this situation—for example, one might consider approaching a legislator—but those that
do not involve the commencement of a civil action are beyond the scope of this Article.
91 A qualification is in order here. Actually, it does not appear that insufficiency of proof
is, per se, a ground for dismissal, at least not under Rule 12(b)(6). Strictly speaking, an action
may be dismissed for failure to state a claim only for factual or legal insufficiency. See Epstein,
supra note 85, at 61 (“The present Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a plaintiff’s case to be
attacked either for its legal or factual sufficiency.”). Insufficiency of proof, though, might be a
ground for dismissal under Rule 11. For a discussion of that issue, see infra Part III.A. As will
be discussed, insufficiency of proof can lead to a dismissal for failure to state a claim only
indirectly, in that it can prevent a plaintiff from alleging sufficient facts to survive a motion to
dismiss, i.e., factual insufficiency. See supra Part II.A. But not all instances of factual
insufficiency are caused by insufficiency of proof. For example, factual insufficiency also can
result when a plaintiff is unaware of the proper pleading standard, or for some reason refuses to
allege sufficient information. It therefore seems helpful conceptually to distinguish insufficiency
of proof, particularly given its current importance.
92 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 553 (7th ed. 2008).
93 118 P. 1009 (Utah 1911).
94 Id. at 1010.
95 Id. at 1009.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 See id. at 1010 (“Under this statute, if the cow entered upon the right of way through
the open gate, [the railroad company] cannot be held liable for her loss; there being no evidence
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A jury returned a verdict in favor of the rancher.99 The railroad
company appealed on the ground that “the evidence is insufficient to
support the verdict because it fails to show where and under what
circumstances the cattle sued for got upon the right of way.”100 The
Supreme Court of Utah agreed:
There is no direct evidence as to where the cow got on to the
right of way. It is conceded, however, that she was killed in
the immediate vicinity of the gate mentioned, and, as shown
by the evidence, about one mile from the point where the
fence inclosing the right of way was down and out of repair.
The inference, therefore, is just as strong, if not stronger, that
she entered upon the right of way through the open gate as it
is that she entered through the fence at the point where it was
out of repair. . . . [T]he burden was on [the rancher] to
establish the liability of the defendant by a preponderance of
the evidence. It is a familiar rule that where the undisputed
evidence of the plaintiff, from which the existence of an
essential fact is sought to be inferred, points with equal force
to two things, one of which renders the defendant liable and
the other not, the plaintiff must fail. So in this case, in order
to entitle respondent to recover, it was essential for her to
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the cow
entered upon the right of way through the broken down fence.
This the respondent failed to do.
We are of the opinion that the verdict rendered on the first
cause of action is not supported by the evidence, and that the
trial court should have directed a verdict for appellant on that
cause of action in accordance with appellant’s request.101
In modern terms, one might say that the evidence presented at trial
provided no basis upon which a reasonable juror could find in favor
of the rancher. Thus, one can only surmise that the verdict in favor of
the rancher was based on speculation, or perhaps sympathy.102

of negligence on the part of trainmen at the time she was killed.”).
99 See id. (“A trial was had which resulted in a verdict for [the rancher] on each of the four
causes of action.”).
100 Id.
101 Id. It probably did not help the rancher’s case that by the time the case reached the
supreme court, the heifer had become a mere “cow.”
102 Of course, the Reid situation should be contrasted with the more typical situation at trial
in which a defendant’s motion for a directed verdict (or today, at least in federal court, for
judgment as a matter of law) must be denied despite the fact that the jury might well reject the
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Though Reid involved the propriety of a jury verdict following the
admission of evidence at trial, one might consider what the result
might have been if the rancher had included similar allegations in her
complaint, and the railroad company had moved to dismiss for failure
to state a claim (assuming something akin to that procedure existed at
that time and in that place). For example, what if the rancher had
alleged that the heifer escaped either through the fence or the gate;
that she had no evidence indicating whether the fence, as opposed to
the gate, was the more likely exit, but that the railroad company was
nonetheless liable for the heifer’s death?103 Should a motion to
dismiss such an action be granted?
It seems that the answer must be yes. And the reason, at least in a
sense, is insufficiency of proof. For even assuming the allegations in
the rancher’s complaint are true, the rancher cannot prevail, as the
rancher has not shown that she is entitled to the relief requested—or,
in the words of the Twombly and Iqbal Courts, that her claim is
“‘plausible.’”104 The problem is not legal insufficiency, for even the
railroad company conceded that it would be liable upon sufficient
proof that the heifer escaped through the fence. The problem also is
not factual insufficiency, at least not in the usual sense, for the
rancher appears to have alleged as much in the way of nonconclusory
facts as is found in any of the Official Form complaints. Rather, the
problem lies in the fact that the rancher has no way of determining
(and therefore no way of proving) how the heifer escaped, and cannot
(truthfully) allege otherwise. She therefore would be unable to
“nudge[]” her claim “across the line from conceivable to
plausible.”105

plaintiff’s evidence and find in favor of the defendant. Cf. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 564 n.8 (2007) (“[It is an] unobjectionable proposition that, when a complaint adequately
states a claim, it may not be dismissed based on a district court’s assessment that the plaintiff
will fail to . . . prove his claim to the satisfaction of the factfinder.”). The difference is that, in
the more typical situation, a reasonable juror could find in favor of the plaintiff, whereas in
Reid, a reasonable juror could not.
103 Actually, this is essentially what the rancher did allege. See Reid, 118 P. at 1009
(stating in her complaint that she “does not know, and therefore is unable to state, whether the
fence was down or the gate left open”). Even on appeal, the rancher argued that “[i]t is
immaterial whether the heifer strayed on through an inviting open gate or an enticing open
fence. . . .” Id. at 1010 (internal quotation marks omitted).
104 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
105 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. One might say that Reid pleaded herself out of court, and
that might be true in the sense that “the face of the complaint exposed the inadequacy of the
claim.” Ides, supra note 26, at 632. But one alternatively could argue that Reid was never in
court, in the sense that there was nothing she could remove from her complaint to cure the
insufficiency. Rather, the problem was that she could not allege that the heifer more likely than
not exited via the fence.
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And this brings us back to Twombly. The principal problem for the
plaintiffs in Twombly was the failure to allege an actual agreement by
the defendants to restrain trade. But if that was the problem, why did
the plaintiffs not seek leave to amend?106 The answer is somewhat
uncertain, but presumably they were not aware of any actual
agreement of this nature, meaning leave to amend would have been
futile.107 And the reason it would have been futile was (and is) Rule
11, and specifically, Rule 11(b)(3). Rule 11(b)(3) requires that the
“factual contentions [alleged in a complaint] have evidentiary support
or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery.”108 What this means, essentially, is that, in order to
successfully state a claim in federal court, a plaintiff generally must
have the goods (so to speak) ab initio, upfront, at the commencement
of the action.109 Thus (and contrary to what many seem to believe),
106 See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text (discussing amendment as the typical
solution to factual insufficiency).
107 See Tice, supra note 64, at 831 (“Why did the plaintiffs not simply amend their
complaint to allege [an] agreement [to conspire] directly . . . ? Barring attorney incompetence,
the answer must be that the plaintiffs did not believe that such an amended pleading would have
succeeded.” (footnote omitted)).
108 FED R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1) (proscribing complaints
“presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly
increase the cost of litigation”); FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2) (requiring claims to be “warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law
or for establishing new law”). This does not mean that a plaintiff must plead evidence, whatever
that phrase might mean. A plaintiff may attach and adopt by reference documents to a
complaint, see FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c), and may verify its complaint, see FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a)
(“Unless a rule or statute specifically states otherwise, a pleading need not be verified . . . .”),
but it is not required to do so. But this does not detract from the point that whatever is pleaded
generally must have evidentiary support.
Incidentally, this requirement probably supplies part of the reason why a plaintiff’s
allegations are assumed to be true. For at the pleading stage, no one, aside from the plaintiff,
knows the full nature or extent of the plaintiff’s evidence supporting its allegations; everyone
else simply is required to assume that it exists. This stands in sharp contrast to the procedure at
summary judgment and at trial, where a plaintiff’s allegations (except to the extent admitted by
the defendant) are essentially disregarded, and the focus turns to “paper” evidence (in the case
of summary judgment) or actual, admitted evidence (in the case of judgment as a matter of law).
109 Of course, Rule 11(b)(3) alternatively permits a plaintiff to allege that it is “likely” that
its allegations will have evidentiary support after further investigation or discovery, a provision
that was designed to provide some relief for plaintiffs that lack sufficient evidence at
commencement. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). Regrettably, it seems unlikely that a plaintiff will,
on the one hand, lack sufficient evidentiary support for its allegations, and yet, on the other
hand, be able certify that it is “likely” it will be able to obtain such support at some point in the
future. As Carl Tobias explains:
[Rule 11’s] “duty of candor,” requiring litigants who make assertions that may lack
evidentiary support to identify specifically that possibility, can be very burdensome, particularly
for parties with limited access to information involving their allegations or few resources for
gathering, assessing, and synthesizing that material which is accessible. When pertinent
information is in the defendants’ minds or files, for example, plaintiffs will encounter great
difficulty in specifically delineating contentions which are likely to be substantiated after
reasonable opportunity for additional investigation or discovery, before they have had that
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one may not allege facts based solely on wishful thinking, and on
what one hopes to obtain during discovery.110 Rather, a claim that is
lacking in evidentiary support is a claim that simply may not be
pleaded, at least not properly.111 Perhaps this has not always been the
standard, but this has been the law in the federal courts since at least
1993, the year this portion of Rule 11 was amended to read as it does
today, if not 1983, the year this rule was given its current “bite.”112

opportunity. Even if the plaintiffs do not participate in unalloyed speculation, they would still
experience problems designating those allegations which probably will have support, identifying
them with sufficient particularity, and ascertaining what is a reasonable opportunity.
Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision of Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. L.J. 171, 203 (1994)
(footnotes omitted). As a result, such allegations are probably rare (and again, would have to be
specifically so identified).
110 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (“Rule 8 marks a notable and
generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not
unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”).
111 Of course, a lack of evidentiary support for an element of a plaintiff’s claim will
probably also prevent that plaintiff from pleading nonconclusory allegations relating to that
element. But for reasons to be developed, it appears that the bigger problem for plaintiffs in this
situation is not (or should not be) the standard for pleading per se, but rather Rule 11.
112 See GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE
§ 2(A), at 1-5 (4th ed. 2008) (“Although [Rule 11] was originally adopted in 1938, it had no real
bite for 45 years, until August 1983.”). Originally, Rule 11 provided in pertinent part:
The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading;
that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and
that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the
purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as though
the pleading had not been served.
Id. § 4(A), at 2-5 to -6. In 1983, the “good ground to support” language was stricken and
in its place the plaintiff (or its attorney) was required to certify:
[T]hat to the best of [his or her] knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed
for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase
in the cost of litigation.
Id., at 2-5. The most recent significant amendment to Rule 11 occurred in 1993. This
eliminated the “well grounded in fact” language in favor of what became Rule 11(b)(3): “[T]he
allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery.” Id., at 2-3. Though the “allegations” portion of this passage was
later eliminated as redundant, see id., at 2-1 (“[T]he factual contentions have evidentiary support
or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery”), this is essentially how the rule reads today.
Whether the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 resulted in a significant change in pleading
standards is unclear. The 1983, “well grounded in fact” standard “was satisfied if a reasonable
person in the signer’s position would have believed the factual allegations to be true.” Id.
§ 2(A)(1), at 1-9. On the other hand, “the use of the words ‘evidence’ and ‘evidentiary support’”
in the current version of Rule 11 “impart the notion of admissibility—i.e., that admissible
evidence will be forthcoming at least at some point in the pretrial process.” Id. § 2(A)(4), at
1-33. Regardless, there is no question but that pleading standards changed somewhat
dramatically (if indirectly) following the 1983 amendments to Rule 11.
Thus, for those who argue that the Twombly and Iqbal Courts are not interpreting the law
of pleading as it used to be interpreted, one might fairly ask, to which era are they speaking? If
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Thus, for plaintiffs that lack the evidence they need to “show” that
they are entitled to the relief requested (and cannot show that they are
likely to obtain such evidence later), the importance of Rule 11(b)(3)
probably cannot be overstated.113 With respect to federal pleading, it
is the proverbial elephant in the (court)room.
And there is one more piece to the puzzle. Why did the plaintiffs
in Twombly lack evidentiary support for their claim, to the point
where they were unable to plead such a claim consistent with Rule
11? The answer might be that such evidence simply does not exist,
and undoubtedly that is true in many cases in which the plaintiff is

they are speaking of the law as it applied in, say, Conley, the appropriate response might be yes,
but that law has changed. Thus (for example), in his dissenting opinion in Twombly, Justice
Stevens stated, “This case is a poor vehicle for the Court’s new pleading rule, for we have
observed that ‘in antitrust cases, where “the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged
conspirators,” . . . dismissals prior to giving the plaintiff ample opportunity for discovery should
be granted very sparingly.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 586–87 (2007) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (omission in original) (quoting Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S.
738, 746 (1976)). Obviously, the case cited by Justice Stevens in support of this proposition
predates 1983. Of course, if what these critics really mean is that they liked the former law
better (or that it was in some normative sense superior), they might again be correct, though that
is a different argument.
Incidentally, there has been some debate regarding the source of the Court’s choice of the
word “plausible” in this context, and some have argued (persuasively) that it derives from
substantive antitrust law. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, The Substantive Origins of “Plausible
Pleadings”: An Introduction to the Symposium on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 1, 3 (2010) (“In antitrust doctrine, the word plausible has been used to assess antitrust
pleadings and proof in a manner that has less to do with the form of an allegation—‘procedural
plausibility’—and, in contrast, more to do with a substantive evaluation of proof or allegation
advanced by a claimant.”). But it might be observed that this same word also was used in
connection with the 1983 and 1993 amendments to Rule 11. See, e.g., Note, Plausible
Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 630, 632 (1987)
(“[T]he 1983 amendments . . . conflict with the liberal pleading regime of the Federal Rules by
demanding greater specificity in pleading and by discouraging the pleading of novel legal
theories.”).
113 It is also important to keep in mind, though, that for plaintiffs that do have sufficient
evidence, Rule 11(b)(3) poses no impediment. In other words, it is important to recall the
distinction between factual insufficiency and insufficiency of proof. For example, Professor
Hoffman argues that “an allegation that is implausible may also be said to violate Rule
11(b)(3).” Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal
Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1254
(2008). Though this might have been true in Twombly and Iqbal, it is by no means true in many
(if not most) other cases, cases in which a complaint might be deemed insufficient but in which
the plaintiff possesses sufficient evidence of a claim.
Incidentally, there is now some question as to whether Twombly and Iqbal apply to
answers as well as complaints. Generally speaking, the answer seems to be “no,” in that the
“showing” requirement contained in Rule 8(a)(2) does not appear in those portions of Rule 8
relating to responsive pleadings. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)–(c). Nonetheless, Rule 8(b)(5) requires
that “[a] party that lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of
an allegation must so state . . . .” Id. 8(b)(5). Moreover, in addition to the more general
commands of Rule 11, see supra note 109, Rule 11(b)(4) requires that “the denials of factual
contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based
on belief or a lack of information.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(4).
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unable to satisfy the burden imposed by this rule. But we also know
(or strongly suspect) that there are some cases, perhaps many cases, in
which such evidence lies in the hands of others, including the
defendant. Why does a plaintiff in this situation not simply obtain that
evidence before commencement? That would be prudent if it were
possible; but in many cases, it is not. The reason is that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure generally do not provide for preaction
discovery.114 As a result, there are few opportunities for obtaining
such evidence before filing the complaint, and even fewer means of
compelling production of such evidence. Thus, just as Rule 11
prevents a plaintiff from pleading a claim lacking sufficient
evidentiary support, the inability to conduct sufficient preaction
discovery is largely responsible for preventing some plaintiffs from
satisfying Rule 11.
Somewhat surprisingly, following Twombly and Iqbal, this
inability to conduct preaction discovery has received only limited
attention, and the impact of Rule 11 has received almost none.115
Instead, most have accused the Supreme Court of dramatically
changing federal pleading standards, and of “amending” Rule 8 by
judicial decision.116 But unlike Rule 11, Rule 8 has not changed
appreciably since its inception,117 and though reinterpretations of
longstanding legal text are not without precedent,118 such
reinterpretations are relatively rare, and the Court gave no indication
that it was doing so in either Twombly or Iqbal.119 Moreover, the
Supreme Court already has penultimate control over the content of
the Rules,120 and it is well aware that formal amendment is the better
way of effecting this sort of change.121 It is, therefore, simply
114 See, e.g., Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Access to Information, Access to Justice: The
Role of Presuit Investigatory Discovery, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 217, 227 (2007) (“According
to the prevailing understanding, [Rule 27] is not meant for investigating the facts in advance of
drafting a complaint.”). Incidentally, unlike Rule 11, this “rule” against preaction discovery has
remained essentially unchanged since 1938.
115 The same is true of the Twombly and Iqbal opinions themselves, in which the Court
says very little about either (and what it does say seems to suggest an incomplete understanding
of the law in this area, see infra notes 148–51 and accompanying text).
116 See supra note 6 and infra note 153 and accompanying text.
117 See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 42, § 1201, at 85 (“Rule 8 has been amended only
twice since its promulgation and those alterations were of a relatively minor nature.”). Though
Rule 8 has been further amended since 2004, those amendments were extremely minor.
118 See, e.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (reinterpreting the Rules of
Decision Act).
119 See Steinman, supra note 3, at 1320 (“Nothing in the reasoning of either Twombly or
Iqbal suggests that the Court has now claimed for itself the power to amend the Rules via its
adjudicative decision making.”).
120 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2074 (2006) (describing the federal rulemaking process as
between the Supreme Court and Congress).
121 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14 (stating that the only process
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implausible (pun intended) that the Court intended to do much more
than clarify a plaintiff’s obligations in this regard and thereby
invigorate Rule 12(b)(6) practice, however unartfully it might have
done so. In other words, what the Court appears to have done here, in
the pleading context, is essentially what it did more than thirty years
ago in the summary-judgment area with Celotex, Liberty Lobby, and
Matsushita, cases that similarly involved no rewriting of rule text.122
But even if Twombly and Iqbal did bring about a change in federal
pleading standards, they did so only with respect to those complaints
suffering from insufficiency of proof. For (again), most factually
insufficient complaints may be rendered sufficient by amendment,
and the legally sufficient complaint did not become insufficient as a
result of these cases.
Of course, the foregoing discussion fails to answer the question:
whether the Rules, and particularly Rule 11, currently set forth the
“appropriate” pleading standard. Do they? That depends on one’s
perspective. There are advantages to a regime in which little in the
way of evidence would be needed before the commencement of an
action. There would also be disadvantages. The same is true of the
current regime. For even though the vast majority of plaintiffs are
able to plead sufficient facts even under the constraint imposed by
Rule 11(b)(3), some are not.
But critics of the current regime should realize that, regardless of
whether the limitation imposed by Rule 11(b)(3) is a good or a bad
idea, this limitation prevents a plaintiff from properly pleading any
claim for which evidence is lacking, regardless of how Rule 8 is
interpreted. For example, a plaintiff that lacked evidence of a

for broadening the scope of a federal rule is by amendment and not judicial interpretation).
Indeed, even the Court’s critics presumably would have to concede that the Supreme Court
could not amend a rule by judicial decision, for aside from Congressional abrogation, the rules
themselves, at least by implication, seem to provide the sole means by which amendment may
be accomplished.
Incidentally, a similar criticism—arguably more well founded—was directed toward the
1983 amendments to Rule 11. See Note, Plausible Pleadings, supra note 112, at 634 (“The 1983
amendments to rule 11 have altered the standard for sufficient pleading. Although they do not
explicitly change that standard, the amendments articulate a standard for avoiding sanctions that
requires a complaint to specify legal and factual bases to a fuller extent than that necessary to
survive a motion to dismiss.” (footnotes omitted)).
122 This is not to say that the Twombly and Iqbal decisions did not upset some lawyers’
understandings regarding pleading sufficiency; as mentioned previously, it appears that they
have. See supra note 6. But the same was true of the summary-judgment trilogy with respect to
the law governing motions for summary judgment. See, e.g., 11 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.03[1] at 56-23 to -24 (3d ed. 2010) (“Courts and
commentators quickly perceived the trilogy as ushering in a ‘new era’ for more favorable
judicial attitudes toward summary judgment.”).
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defendant’s negligence could not plead “negligence,” even if that
were all Rule 8 required.123 Thus, for those who are dissatisfied with
the results in cases like Twombly and Iqbal, the amendment of Rule
11, and/or greatly enhanced opportunities for preaction discovery—
and not the amendment of Rule 8, or the abrogation of (or return to)
some Supreme Court precedent—appears to be the proper solution.
Indeed, unless this lack-of-evidence-at-commencement “problem” is
addressed, it is not entirely clear what else could be done. The reason,
again, is that insufficiency of proof has a double effect. As virtually
everyone has realized, it will prevent a plaintiff from satisfying
anything beyond the most liberal pleading standard.124 But
insufficiency of proof will also prevent a plaintiff from satisfying any
pleading standard that includes sufficiency of proof as a
prerequisite.125
One last point regarding insufficiency of proof: some have argued
that a plaintiff that is faced with a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim and is unable to plead sufficient facts due to a lack of
evidence should be permitted to conduct limited discovery (dubbed
by some as “plausibility discovery”126) for this purpose. For example,
123 It is true that the defense of failure to state a claim may be waived by the defendant. But
this does not mean that the obligations imposed by Rule 11 are optional; on the contrary, they
appear to be quite mandatory. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. The same arguably could be said of Rule 8
and the pleading of a claim, which is written in mandatory terms. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
124 See, e.g., Hartnett, supra note 5, at 474 (“[The major criticism is] that the Court
imposed a heightened specificity standard of pleading and that plaintiffs will lack the evidence
to plead these specifics prior to discovery.”).
125 For example, a bill was recently introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives calling
for the enactment of a new section to title 28 of the United States Code that would provide in
pertinent part:
A court shall not dismiss a complaint under subdivision (b)(6), (c) or (e) of Rule 12 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle the plaintiff to relief. A court shall not
dismiss a complaint under one of those subdivisions on the basis of a determination by the judge
that the factual contents of the complaint do not show the plaintiff’s claim to be plausible or are
insufficient to warrant a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.
Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. § 2078(a) (2009). Arguably,
there are several problems with this proposal; for example, if the “no set of facts” language
indeed relates to legal insufficiency (as this Article suggests), then it is superfluous, in that it is a
proposition with which everyone already agrees. But more to the point, regarding the last
sentence and its proposed treatment of the “factual contents of the complaint,” it seems that one
does not even reach this issue unless, consistent with Rule 11, one can plead sufficient facts in
the first instance. In other words, for plaintiffs lacking sufficient evidence, permitting plaintiffs
to plead more generally (or in a more conclusory fashion) will not help, for a claim lacking
evidentiary support will continue to lack evidentiary support. And the same is true, it seems,
with most, if not all, of the alternative proposals currently being circulated. For a collection (and
discussion) of such proposals, see Edward A. Hartnett, Responding to Twombly and Iqbal:
Where Do We Go from Here?, 95 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 24 (2010).
126 Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery
Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
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Professor Hartnett argues, “discovery can proceed prior to the filing
of a 12(b)(6) motion and during its pendency.”127
With all due respect to those advocating this approach, the
argument in support of “plausibility discovery,” on balance, seems
wanting. Most significantly, it appears fairly clear that the drafters of
the Rules, principally through Rule 11, have already made the
decision as to where to draw the line regarding whether and to what
extent a plaintiff must have the evidence needed to prove its case
before commencement. To put the matter more bluntly: Rule 11(b)(3)
flatly contradicts the notion of “plausibility discovery.” The structure
of the Rules generally also seems to belie this approach. The principal
concern of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is whether a
plaintiff should be allowed to proceed (and therefore to engage in
such things as discovery); indeed, this defense may be asserted before
the defendant is required to answer the complaint.128 Moreover, the
idea of conducting discovery for the purpose of adding additional
information to the complaint traditionally has been regarded as
anathema to the modern pleading scheme.129 Finally, there is the
matter of timing. Rule 26(d)(1) provides that a party generally “may
not seek discovery from any source before the parties have conferred
as required by Rule 26(f).”130 Rule 26(f)(1) provides that the parties
generally are not required to confer as to discovery until “21 days
before a scheduling conference is to be held or a scheduling order is
due under Rule 16(b).”131 And Rule 16(b)(2) provides that the court is
not required to issue a scheduling order until “the earlier of 120 days
after any defendant has been served with the complaint or 90 days
after any defendant has appeared.”132 Given that a responsive
pleading (such as an answer) generally must be served by a defendant

65, 68 (2010).
127 Hartnett, supra note 5, at 507.
128 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) (stating that a motion asserting any of the defenses
enumerated in the rule must be made before pleading if a responsive pleading is allowed).
129 See, e.g., 5C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 42, § 1376, at 327 (“Once discovery has
begun, there is no real value in requiring the plaintiff to go back and insert the results of that
process in the complaint . . . .”). Though this criticism was lodged with respect to discovery
conducted in response to a motion for a more definite statement, the same reasoning would
seem to apply here. See id. (stating that courts’ occasional practice of granting motions for a
more definite statement to allow the pleader the opportunity for more discovery “is a dubious
procedure” and has little value). Following discovery, a plaintiff might amend its complaint to
add a claim (or perhaps even to delete a claim), but not, ordinarily, to bolster a claim it has
already attempted to plead.
130 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1).
131 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(1).
132 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(2).

2/15/2011 7:09:03 PM

2011]

I HAVE FEDERAL PLEADING ALL FIGURED OUT

485

within twenty-one days of being served with process,133 and that a
preanswer motion to dismiss “must be made before pleading if a
responsive pleading is allowed,”134 the Rules obviously contemplate
that discovery generally should not proceed until after any preanswer
motions to dismiss are resolved.135 In any event, for some or all of
these reasons, the Iqbal Court (though perhaps in dicta) rejected this
possibility.136
This does not mean, of course, that “plausibility discovery” is
completely unattractive as a normative matter, and that the rules
governing discovery could not be amended to provide for this
possibility; they could. But such rules would be in tension (to put it
mildly) with Rule 11, and would run up against the policy concerns
133 FED.

R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A).
R. CIV. P. 12(b).
135 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(i) (“If a party so moves, any defense listed in Rule 12(b)(1)–
(7)—whether made in a pleading or by motion—and a motion [for judgment on the pleadings]
must be heard and decided before trial unless the court orders a deferral until trial.”). Though
Rule 12(i) does not say how far before trial such motions must be heard and decided, there is a
very strong presumption that they be resolved promptly. For example, it would make little
sense—indeed, it would be unfair—to compel a defendant to engage in extensive discovery as
to the merits in an action where jurisdiction is lacking. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(c)(1) (generally
permitting the service of a motion and notice of hearing in as few as fourteen days before the
date of the hearing). Though Rule 12(i) further provides for the possibility of a deferred ruling
on such motions, such a deferral is exceptional, and presumably would be granted only in those
rare situations in which the defense is inextricably intertwined with the merits—something that
does not occur in the failure to state a claim context. Thus, even proponents of “plausibility
discovery,” who are only seeking a deferral until the completion of such discovery, would
probably concede that a deferral until trial is inappropriate.
136 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009) (“Because respondent’s complaint
is deficient under Rule 8, he is not entitled to discovery, cabined or otherwise.”); see also Robert
G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 882–83 (2010) (“To be sure, investigation through discovery can
reveal useful information, but investigation is not in itself the purpose of adjudication. That
purpose is to furnish remedies for substantive law violations.”); McMahon, supra note 4, at 866
(“The Second Circuit’s casual suggestion that a district court might wish to order some
discovery before considering a motion addressed to a pleading fundamentally misconceives the
nature of the demurrer and undermines the procedural jurisprudence of Rule 12(b)(6) motions—
jurisprudence that was as well settled as the ‘no set of facts’ rule until Twombly.”); Lisa
Pondrom, Comment, Predicting the Unpredictable Under Rule 11(b)(3): When Are Allegations
“Likely” to Have Evidentiary Support?, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1393, 1394 (1996) (“Discovery plays
a central role in contemporary federal civil procedure. But under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a pleader gains access to discovery only if a valid complaint is on file with the
court.”).
The argument against “plausibility discovery” also seems to apply to other efforts to
circumvent Rule 11. For example, Judge McMahon argues:
[T]here are claims where important factual information is particularly within the control of
the defendant. This makes it harder for the plaintiff to allege enough facts to meet the
plausibility standard. To assess the issue of “plausibility” in such cases, it is probably useful for
district judges to invoke Rule 8(e) of the Federal Rules, which states, “Pleadings must be
construed so as to do justice.”
McMahon, supra note 4, at 867 (footnotes omitted). But it is one thing to construe a
pleading so as to do justice; it is quite another to permit discovery in the name of justice when
the Rules provide to the contrary.
134 FED.
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identified by the Court in Twombly and Iqbal. Again, a more systemic
overhaul probably would be required.
III. TWO LOOSE ENDS
Before concluding, this Article will now turn to two areas of
special concern, particularly following Twombly and Iqbal: the proper
treatment of frivolous complaints, and the possible disparity between
federal and state pleading standards and the conflicting results that
might be produced under each.
A. Frivolous Complaints
The first area of concern relates to the frivolous complaint, more
specifically the “factually frivolous” complaint (i.e., a complaint that
consists of allegations “sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as we
know it”).137 To use Justice Souter’s example in Iqbal, what if a
plaintiff were to allege claims “about little green men, or the
plaintiff’s recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel”?138 If the
defendant in such an action were to move to dismiss the action for
failure to state a claim, what should be the result? Should the motion
be granted?
Most lawyers—as well as most judges—would probably say
“yes.”139 But though few would disagree with that result—after all,
everyday experience suggests that such allegations are absurd and
patently false—such a ruling arguably would be incorrect. The
primary reason relates (again) to the principle that at this stage in the
proceedings, the plaintiff’s allegations must be assumed to be true.140
And if the allegations in Justice Souter’s hypothetical complaint are
true, the plaintiff might well have stated a valid claim.141 Another
problem with such an interpretation of Rule 12(b)(6) is that it lends
137 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1959 (Souter, J., dissenting). Such a complaint might be roughly
distinguished from the legally frivolous complaint, which consists of allegations that are true,
but that neither states a recognized claim nor is backed by a “nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” FED. R. CIV. P.
11(b)(2).
138 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1959 (Souter, J., dissenting). Those who have dealt with pro se
complaints will recognize that such hypotheticals are not so hypothetical.
139 Indeed, Justice Souter, in his dissenting opinion in Iqbal, implied as much, see id.
(discussing the “sole exception” to the standard that a court shall take the alleged facts as true),
and no other Justice took issue with that conclusion.
140 See, e.g., id. at 1951 (opinion of the Court) (“To be clear, we do not reject [the
plaintiff’s] bald allegations on the ground that they are unrealistic or nonsensical.”); see also
supra note 54 and accompanying text.
141 And in any event, how are we to know? Maybe the plaintiff did go to Pluto; it is going
to be true some day. And let us not forget that truth very often is stranger than fiction. For
example, how many of us foresaw the Court’s holding in Twombly, let alone Iqbal?
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credence to the notion that the word “plausibility” as used by the
Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal means (essentially)
believability. But the issue at this stage in the proceedings is not
whether a court “believes” that a claim has been stated; rather, the
issue is whether a claim has been stated. The credibility of the
plaintiff is simply not relevant. Under Rule 12(b)(6), therefore, a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim seemingly must be
denied, for the underlying complaint could not be regarded as
deficient, assuming it included sufficient detail and otherwise stated a
legally sufficient claim. As the Supreme Court explained in a
somewhat different context:
Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the
basis of a dispositive issue of law. . . . What Rule 12(b)(6)
does not countenance are dismissals based on a judge’s
disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations. District court
judges looking to dismiss claims on such grounds must look
elsewhere for legal support.142
Does this mean, then, that there is nothing a court may do with such a
complaint? Must such a plaintiff be allowed to proceed? No. But
rather than a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), it seems that the
better procedure would be a motion for sanctions under Rule 11. A
motion for sanctions under Rule 11 may be initiated either by a party
or by the court itself,143 and the possible nonmonetary penalties for
violation of this rule include the dismissal of the action.144 Such a
proceeding would provide the plaintiff with the opportunity to prove
the seemingly impossible, though without the assumption as to the
truthfulness of its allegations as provided under Rule 12(b)(6).145 The
142 Neitzke

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1989).
The same would also seem to be true with respect to a plaintiff that relies on the second
part of Rule 11(b)(3)—that certain “factual contentions” alleged in the complaint, “if
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for
further investigation or discovery.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). Just as a court (at least for Rule
12(b)(6) purposes) must accept as true a plaintiff’s nonconclusory allegations generally, it seems
that it also must accept as true any allegations as to which evidentiary support is not yet in the
possession of the plaintiff, but is likely to be in the future. Moreover, it also seems that the
invocation of this portion of Rule 11(b)(3) should insulate a plaintiff from the argument that its
complaint is factually insufficient; of course it is, for the very reason that the plaintiff is not yet
in possession of anything more specific. Any other interpretation of Rule 11(b)(3) would
effectively prevent a plaintiff from utilizing this procedure.
143 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2)–(3) (addressing the initiation of sanctions by motion or the
court’s initiative).
144 See, e.g., 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 488, ¶ 11.24[2], at 11-67 (discussing the
dismissal of an action as a severe sanction).
145 In other words, though a plaintiff’s nonconclusory allegations must be taken as true for
purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), they need not be taken as true if challenged under Rule 11
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result would be the same—the action would be dismissed—though
without the theoretical difficulties posed by a dismissal for failure to
state a claim.146
To summarize: the appropriate standard for determining whether a
plaintiff has adequately stated a claim—frivolous or not—is
sufficiency, not believability. The insufficient complaint may be
attacked pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6); the unbelievable complaint may
not. But the unbelievable complaint may be attacked pursuant to Rule
11, though not for unbelievability per se, but rather for lack of
evidentiary support.147 Neither the insufficient nor the frivolous
complaint should be allowed to proceed. But they are different
subsets of a larger universe. Not all frivolous complaints are
insufficient, at least not in the Rule 12(b)(6) sense, just as not all
insufficient complaints are frivolous. Of course, in either situation,
the defendant challenging the complaint in question had better be
correct (or, more accurately, must himself comply with the
requirements imposed by Rule 11), for a baseless motion by a
defendant in either context should not only be denied, but should
subject that party to sanctions as well.

(understanding that the defendant presumably would have the burden of proving otherwise). See
Note, Plausible Pleadings, supra note 112, at 635 (“Rule 11 authorizes sanctions for claims that
are not ‘grounded in fact.’ This provision is important because pretrial motions under other rules
might fail to screen out such claims. Courts deciding motions to dismiss under rule 12 must
assume that all facts alleged are true.” (footnotes omitted)) .
146 Tobias Wolff makes a somewhat similar argument, albeit not in the frivolous context.
See Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 317 (2009) (statement of Tobias Barrington Wolff,
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School) (discussing the application of Rule
11(b)(3) to test the evidentiary support of plaintiff’s allegations).
Incidentally, it might be observed that a district court might still get it wrong in this
context, in that a plaintiff might tell a ridiculously fantastic story that is actually true. Subatomic
physics (among other subjects) provides several examples. But this sort of error unfortunately
inures in adjudication generally; it is tolerated because it is ultimately unavoidable.
147 Thus, for example, Professor Steinman is mostly correct when he writes that “[t]he
inquiry [at the pleading stage] is not whether the plaintiff has or was likely to uncover evidence
to support the allegations in the complaint.” Steinman, supra note 3, at 1301 (emphasis
omitted). This is true for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), but it is not true with respect to Rule 11.
Similarly, Professor Steinman writes that “a summary judgment motion is the device for testing
pretrial whether the plaintiff has sufficient evidence to support its claims.” Id. at 1330; accord
Hoffman, supra note 113, at 1254 (“Rule 11 is a certification and sanctioning rule and not
normally the vehicle for dismissing insufficient claims. That is what Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56
are for.”). Again, this seems to be true, but only in part. A motion for summary judgment is the
proper procedure for determining whether there is a “genuine issue as to any material fact,”
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2); a motion for sanctions is the proper procedure for determining whether
the plaintiff’s allegations “have evidentiary support,” id. 11(b)(3). Of course, Professor
Steinman is quite correct that a plaintiff that pleads claims that lack evidentiary support—and
gains nothing in discovery—also would be vulnerable at summary judgment, just as it would be
at trial. But that is of little solace to the defendant hoping to avoid needless expense.
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Regrettably, not only did the Twombly and Iqbal Courts fail to
make this distinction, but it is also not entirely clear that they
appreciated it. For example, in Twombly, the Court stated, “Asking
for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a
probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for
enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will
reveal evidence of illegal agreement.”148 But under Rule 11(b)(3), a
plaintiff’s “factual contentions” (unless qualified in the manner
specified in that rule) are required to have evidentiary support when
pleaded.149 Because of this misunderstanding, one almost gets the
sense that the Court’s plausibility standard, perhaps inadvertently, is
intended to serve as a sort of proxy for a plaintiff’s obligations under
Rule 11. Consider, again, Twombly: the essential problem for the
plaintiffs in that case was that they had no specific evidence of any
agreement by the defendants to restrain trade. But rather than sanction
the plaintiffs for violating their obligation under Rule 11(b)(3), the
Court imposed a pleading standard that, for the very same reason—
lack of evidence—the plaintiffs could not meet. The same appears to
be true in Iqbal, wherein the Court stated, “respondent’s complaint
does not contain any factual allegation sufficient to plausibly suggest
petitioners’ discriminatory state of mind.”150 The Iqbal Court actually
seemed to be saying that it doubted the plaintiff had any specific
evidence as to these defendants’ state of mind.151
Does this mean, then, that Rule 11 plays as significant a role in
actions such as Twombly and Iqbal as it does in frivolous actions? It
seems that it must, and the reason relates to the quantum of proof
required under that rule. Rule 11(b)(3) generally requires that a
148 Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 556 (2007).
are several other examples. For instance, in Twombly, the Court noted “the
unobjectionable proposition that, when a complaint adequately states a claim, it may not be
dismissed based on a district court’s assessment that the plaintiff will fail to find evidentiary
support for his allegations or prove his claim to the satisfaction of the factfinder.” Id. at 564 n.8
(emphasis added). Again, this might be true for the purpose of a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim (and related proceedings), but not for purposes of Rule 11. Similarly, Justice
Stevens in dissent stated, “This case is a poor vehicle for the Court’s new pleading rule, for we
have observed that ‘in antitrust cases, where “the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged
conspirators,” . . . dismissals prior to giving the plaintiff ample opportunity for discovery should
be granted very sparingly.’” Id. at 586–87 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (omission in original)
(quoting Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976)). But as discussed
previously, Rule 11 generally proscribes the allegation of all claims lacking evidentiary support,
including those where “the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators,” id., and
regardless of what discovery (if it were allowed) might reveal. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3).
150 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952 (2009).
151 Benjamin Spencer advances a somewhat similar argument. See A. Benjamin Spencer,
Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 192–97
(2010) (discussing the Iqbal court’s skepticism towards factual allegations and its effect on the
assumption-of-truth rule).
149 There
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plaintiff’s factual contentions have “evidentiary support.” What does
that mean? It cannot mean any evidentiary support, for the
uncorroborated (and fantastic) testimony of a mentally ill individual
cannot be regarded as sufficient; if it were, there would be no basis
for dismissing even the factually frivolous complaint. That cannot be
correct. But the same also must be true of seemingly nonfrivolous
actions like Reid. If a plaintiff’s evidence is such that the plaintiff
cannot possibly win at trial, such evidence is every bit as insufficient
as evidence of time travel.
So how much more evidentiary support is needed? It seems, once
again, that the standard must be sufficient evidence from which a
reasonable juror could find or infer sufficient facts to find in favor of
the plaintiff. No lesser standard makes sense, particularly given the
fallback provision, which alternatively allows a plaintiff to allege (if
true) that its factual contentions “will likely have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery.”152
Of course, the fact that the Court might have failed to appreciate
the import of Rule 11 does not necessarily mean that the Court’s
interpretation of Rule 8 was incorrect, or that the “showing” required
under that rule does not also serve some other purpose. But the
imposition of a more stringent pleading standard than that required
under Rule 8, if that (as many believe) is what the Court has done,153
seems like a poor way of addressing the problems caused by an
insufficiency of proof. As Professors Clermont and Yeazell cogently
observe, “Rule 11 now punishes those who make allegations without
an evidentiary basis for doing so; indeed, one could have less
disruptively attained an equivalent of the Twombly and Iqbal regime
by aggressively rereading Rule 11 rather than Rule 8.”154 The
Twombly Court’s concerns regarding the high cost of discovery and
the possibility of extorted settlements, though dubious as
justifications for reinterpreting Rule 8, were precisely the concerns of
the drafters of the amendments to Rule 11. But few seem interested in
pursuing Rule 11 to its logical conclusion.155 Instead, most courts and

152 FED.

R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3).
Hartnett, supra note 5, at 474 (“Scholarly reaction to Twombly has been largely
critical, with most complaining that the Court imposed a heightened specificity standard of
pleading and that plaintiffs will lack the evidence to plead these specifics prior to discovery.”).
154 Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 6, at 849 (footnotes omitted).
155 For example, if plaintiffs truly had evidentiary support for their claims at
commencement (and defendants truly had evidentiary support for their denials), there would be
little need for summary judgment, as any such motion (at least to the extent it turned on the
evidence) would have to be denied.
153 See
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commentators seem almost oblivious to its terms, or at least have
exhibited some degree of willful blindness to its obligations.
B. The Divergence of Federal and State Pleading Standards
Another problem, brought to the fore following Twombly and
Iqbal, relates to the divergence (or potential divergence) of federal
and state pleading standards. Many states have pleading rules similar
to Rule 8.156 Many of these purportedly rely on the portion of Conley
that was repudiated in Twombly.157 Moreover, many states do not
have anything similar to Rule 11(b)(3). And even if they did, any
such rule could be amended at any time.158 Of course, the fact that
federal and state procedural rules might be different is not, of itself, a
serious problem; though it might be more convenient if they were the
same, there are very few legal requirements along this line. But a
difficulty potentially arises due to the fact that a dismissal for failure
to state a claim is generally regarded as being “on the merits” or “with
prejudice”—i.e., it precludes the assertion of the same claim in a later
action, just as surely as an adverse decision on a motion for summary
judgment or at trial.159 The problem is that a complaint might be
found deficient in a federal court, yet if filed in a state court and
tested under state procedural rules, might survive a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim.
Some have argued that this potential disparity in treatment creates
a problem under Erie, such that a federal court in a diversity action
might be required to adopt certain state pleading standards. But such
an argument seems untenable, for if Hanna v. Plumer160 still means
anything, the fact that federal and state laws might seem to conflict in
this area raises no such issue.161 Still, this potential disparity in
156 For a survey of the extent to which states have adopted the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (with a particular emphasis on pleading rules), see John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon,
The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61
WASH. L. REV. 1367 (1986). For a more recent survey (that also includes a consideration of the
1983 and 1993 changes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, see John B. Oakley, A Fresh
Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354 (2003) [hereinafter Oakley, A Fresh
Look].
157 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 578 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“Taking their cues from the federal courts, 26 States and the District of Columbia utilize as
their standard for dismissal of a complaint the very language the majority repudiates . . . .”).
158 See Oakley, A Fresh Look, supra note 1566, at 355 (“While the federal model of civil
procedure remains substantially influential at the state level, it is no longer true that many state
systems of civil procedure replicate the federal model.”).
159 See, e.g., Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981) (stating
that the dismissal of an action under Rule 12(b)(6) constitutes a judgment on the merits).
160 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
161 One leading treatise concludes:
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Hanna v. Plumer, it no longer can be doubted that
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treatment seems troubling. Short of rules unification, is there any
solution to this problem?
Perhaps. To the extent that state pleading rules are more liberal
than the federal rules, one might expect some plaintiffs that
previously might have commenced their actions in federal court to
commence their actions in a state court. This is not a complete
solution, though, for subject-matter jurisdiction of some actions lies
exclusively in the federal district courts,162 and to the extent
jurisdiction is concurrent, removal by defendants to a federal district
court likely remains an option.163
But even as to those actions adjudicated in federal court, a plaintiff
that is dismissed for failure to state a claim might find some relief.
The answer, if there is one, lies in the reasons why dismissals for
failure to state claim traditionally have been given claim-preclusive
effect. Legal insufficiency presents the easiest example. If an action is
dismissed for legal insufficiency, dismissal with prejudice seems
appropriate, for both federal and state courts should reach the same
result. There is no reason to give such a plaintiff a second chance. The
same appears to be true with respect to factual insufficiency, though
the reasoning here is somewhat more difficult. Given the liberality of
the federal rules governing amended pleadings, in most actions, only
the most obstinate plaintiffs will fail to comply with the court’s
demands.164 Though a state court might have a less demanding
pleading standard, the “federal courts’ interest in the integrity of their

the rules regarding the standard of specificity to be applied to federal pleadings, . . . the special
requirements for pleading certain matters, the allocation of the burden of pleading among the
parties, and the signing of pleadings by an attorney of record or an unrepresented party, all are
governed by the federal rules and not by the practice of the courts in the state in which the
federal court happens to be sitting.
5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 42, § 1204, at 104–05 (footnote omitted); see also Shady
Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (reconfirming that
applicable and valid federal rules apply in federal court). For somewhat similar reasons, there
also appears to be no reverse-Erie problem, nor a problem under the Seventh Amendment. See,
e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 327 n.8 (2007) (“In numerous
contexts, gatekeeping judicial determinations prevent submission of claims to a jury’s judgment
without violating the Seventh Amendment.”).
162 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006) (“Admiralty, maritime, and prize cases”).
163 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (“Actions removable generally”). In order to avoid removal,
Georgene Vairo argues that such plaintiffs will attempt to “craft their complaints to make them
removal-proof.” Georgene Vairo, Will Iqbal Case Play a Role in Forum Selection?, NAT’L L.J.,
Jan. 25, 2010, at 18. There are limits, though, to the extent to which plaintiffs realistically can
do so.
164 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 19 cmt. d (1982) (“Such a result is
warranted by the ease with which pleadings may be amended . . . and by the unfairness of
requiring the defendant to submit to a second action . . . when no such amendment is sought, or
when no appeal has been taken from an erroneous denial of leave to amend.”).
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own processes” also might justify according claim-preclusive effect
to such a dismissal.165
But what about a dismissal for failure to state a claim based on
factual insufficiency where the inability to plead sufficient facts is
caused by an insufficiency of proof, that is, by the strictures imposed
by Rule 11(b)(3), such as occurred in Twombly and perhaps in Iqbal?
Should such a dismissal be granted with prejudice if a state-court
plaintiff would not be so constrained? Arguably not; rather, such a
disparity in the rules seemingly should be regarded as a matter of
policy imposed by the federal courts that need not be imposed on any
other system. Accordingly, such a dismissal might be regarded as
binding on other federal courts—for surely it should be given
preclusive effect across all federal district courts—but not necessarily
binding on a state court with more liberal pleading requirements. It
might be treated, in other words, as more of a technical requirement,
and one that does not necessarily go to the merits of a plaintiff’s
claim. For under these circumstances, the federal district court would
be deciding only that the plaintiff was unable to plead sufficient
facts—and even then, only because it then lacked supporting
evidence.166 The court would not be deciding that, even if given the
opportunity to conduct discovery, the plaintiff has no case, or that the
plaintiff has willfully failed to comply with the court’s demands.167
One might also consider this problem from the perspective of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41, the rule governing dismissals
generally. Under Rule 41, a plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss its
action by notice if it does so “before the opposing party serves either
an answer or a motion for summary judgment.”168 This means that a
voluntary dismissal remains an option after the filing of a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. But a plaintiff in the typical factual
or legal insufficiency situation is unlikely to avail itself of this
procedure, as in either situation, a voluntary dismissal would be
pointless. If the problem is factual insufficiency, it almost certainly
165 Semtek

Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 (2001).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20(2) (generally denying claimpreclusive effect to judgments that rest “on the prematurity of the action or on the plaintiff’s
failure to satisfy a precondition to suit”). Perhaps one might also consider that when the defense
of failure to state a claim is asserted postpleading, the reason usually is either legal insufficiency
or (more likely) that the plaintiff, even postdiscovery, has insufficient supporting evidence.
Whether the complaint was factually sufficient or the plaintiff’s claims had sufficient
evidentiary support at commencement is typically regarded as irrelevant.
167 Of course, a complaint utterly lacking in evidentiary support could subject the plaintiff
to a dismissal pursuant to Rule 11, and presumably such a dismissal could be made with
prejudice as to all courts. But a less egregious violation of Rule 11 presumably would call for a
less serious sanction. Similar reasoning seemingly should apply in the Rule 12(b)(6) context.
168 FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i).
166 Cf.

2/15/2011 7:09:03 PM

494

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:2

could be cured within the confines of the current action, whereas if
the problem is legal insufficiency, it would be incurable. By contrast,
if the problem is insufficiency of proof, a plaintiff might well avail
itself of this procedure, for such a dismissal generally is without
prejudice,169 and the plaintiff (again) might well fare better in a state
court. And if such a plaintiff may avoid the claim-preclusive effect of
a dismissal for failure to state a claim merely by voluntarily
dismissing its action, it arguably makes little sense to give a dismissal
for failure to state a claim such an effect in essentially the same
procedural context.170
IV. CONCLUSION
At bottom, current federal civil pleading practice has more to do
with the limited opportunities for investigation before commencement
and the obligation to have evidentiary support for one’s allegations
and less to do with pleading standards. Unless and until there are
changes to the former, little can be done with the latter.
In the meantime, it would probably be better if concerns regarding
the strength of a plaintiff’s evidence were resolved through Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11, rather than Rule 8 and a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” should contain enough
information to serve its limited purposes, but no more.
Renewed consideration also should be given to the proper
preclusive effect of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
In particular, when a dismissal is based solely on a plaintiff’s inability
to plead sufficient facts due to a lack of supporting evidence, perhaps
the dismissal should not be given claim-preclusive effect, for in that
situation there has been no constructive adjudication of the underlying
merits, nor does there appear to be any significant federal policy
justifying this result.

169 See

FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(B).
course, if a federal district court had subject-matter jurisdiction of the first action, a
subsequent state-court action probably (though not certainly) could be removed to the same or
another federal district court. This might seem to expose a plaintiff to a series of dismissals,
state-court filings, and removals (at least until the applicable statute of limitations expires). But
Rule 11, by its terms, is inapplicable to papers filed in state court. See JOSEPH, supra note 112,
§ 5(A)(2), at 2-22 to -23 (“Rule 11 does not apply to . . . pleadings, written motions or other
papers served or filed in a state court action . . . .”). Thus, it is at least arguable that a state-court
complaint that was sufficient when filed would remain sufficient following removal, even if
insufficient if filed in federal court.
170 Of

